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JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS[1]

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I

IN the world as we know it to-day it may seem foolish even to speak of such a thing as justice among nations. Whatever we may say about justice within the nation—and even within nations justice seems to have disappeared over a large portion of the globe—it appears obvious that the relation of one nation to another is determined, not by justice, but by force. The state of nature so gloomily described by Hobbes as the condition out of which men have emerged, a state in which there is "continual fear and danger of violent death," seems to be embodied in the international situation as it actually exists. In such a state of war, as Hobbes remarks, "this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice."

The problem, however, is not quite so simple as Hobbes appears to imagine. We must distinguish between what is, and what ought to be; and the actual iniquities of men are no refutation of the claims of morality. Furthermore the word 'justice' is ambiguous. What is just may be the morally incumbent, or it may be the legally incumbent. It is only in the latter sense that there can be no justice or injustice without law, and no law without common power.

Hence we have two problems, which are, however, not unrelated —the problem of moral justice among nations and the problem of legal justice. Let us consider first the problem of moral justice, the problem of what is morally due or obligatory as between nations.

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II

It is a not uncommon view that politics and morality are so different that one has nothing to do with the other, and that it is a mere confusion to speak of the duty of nations or the duty of states. This might hold whether we regard a state as a nation organized under a government or more simply as the government of a nation. Such a view has received a qualified blessing even from so liberal a philosopher as Benedetto Croce. Nevertheless I cannot but believe that it rests upon a confusion, and that if we begin by regarding a state as amoral, we shall end by regarding it as entitled to be immoral.

In such matters it is often well to appeal in the first instance to the common judgment of mankind. I think it would be widely accepted that the state has nothing to do with morality, and that it is only the folly of idealists which make men speak as if it had. But such a judgment may be confusing a question of fact with a question of duty, and in any case it is a theoretical judgment based too often on a minimum of reflection. The important judgment here, as always in moral philosophy, is not the theoretical judgment, which may be superficial, but the practical judgment, by which men's wills are guided and their emotions aroused. Amid all the blatant clamour that might is right, it seems clear that those who maintain this, always mean "my might" and not "your might." When disaster is forced upon them by the might of others, they begin at once to change their tune and declaim against the injustice and the "dictates" of their opponents. There are few feelings stronger among men than the feeling of injustice when injury is done to themselves and to their nation. It is noteworthy that the most unscrupulous of tyrants, stained by blood and steeped in treachery, never cease to maintain that their cause is just and that their opponents are unreasonable, immoral, inhuman, and bestial. What is this but the recognition, even by the hypocrite, of the deep-seated belief among men that there ought to be justice among nations? No doubt—such is the weakness of human nature—we are all more conscious of the wrongs inflicted upon us than of the wrongs that we inflict. Nevertheless, the recognition of the need for justice is there; and if we think seriously, we must allow that justice can be no respecter of persons or of nations. If we claim that anything is just for our own nation, we must allow that something must be just for others.

If we consider the question more philosophically, we are bound, I think, to come to the conclusion that the practical judgment of men in this matter is sound. When we speak of the duty of one nation or state to another, we mean that individual men as citizens,

and above all as statesmen, have a duty to act in a certain way towards the citizens, or towards the statesmen, of another nation. It is of the very essence of morality, if I may speak dogmatically, that our obligations cannot be limited to our own kindred or race or nation but must extend to all rational beings who may be affected by our actions. And these obligations are incumbent upon us as men or as rational beings. We cannot escape them by saying that we are acting, not as individual men, but as statesmen or as representatives and agents of a nation. Duty claims the obedience of men as whole men in all their actions; and we cannot say that there is a part or aspect of ourselves, or of our actions, which can claim exemption. Indeed I suggest that the claim of duty is, if this were possible, more compelling when I act, not merely for myself, but for the nation of which I am a part. And this more compelling claim is not merely a claim that I should do my duty by my nation. It is a claim that I should do my duty, whatever my duty may be. This is indeed the one ultimate, absolute, and inexorable claim which duty makes upon us. When I begin to pick and choose between duties, when I say I will do this duty because it is this duty and not another, I am no longer acting in accordance with a moral, but with a non-moral, motive.

Those who say that politics has nothing to do with morality are explicitly denying the doctrine I have put forward and are, I believe, denying the essential nature of morality itself; for they are saying that part of my life, namely my life as a statesman, is exempt from all moral obligation. It is a less serious, but still a fundamental error, if they say merely that my duty as a statesman is a duty only to my own people. Here duty is indeed recognized as governing my whole life, but only in relation to a limited class of rational beings. Duty is in this way limited and distorted and made, so far, irrational. The law of duty must be universal, binding upon all men in all their relations to one another.

There is, however, a glimmer of truth in the doctrine that the duty of the statesman is to his own people. The law of duty is universal and is no respecter of persons, but nevertheless it has different applications because of my different relations to other men. I have one duty to my creditor, another to my benefactor, and yet another to the man in need of help. Similarly, I have one duty to my family, and another to my country, and yet another to states and nations not my own. The statesman has very special duties to the nation which he governs, but this does not justify him in sweeping away his duty to others. It may be his duty to seek the well-being and prosperity of his own nation, but yet it may be wrong to do this by bringing ruin and destruction upon another.

There is a further truth which by a confusion of thought gives a

show of plausibility to the errors we have considered. The ultimate law of duty must apply differently in different circumstances. One of the most relevant differences in circumstances is due to the presence or absence of a system of law backed by force. If I live in a well-ordered state, it is my duty to obey the law of the state and to remedy my grievances only by legal means. If I live in a state of anarchy, I can have no duty to obey the law, and I must remedy my grievances and defend my rights as best I may. This does not, however, mean that I have no duties; for it would still be my duty to refrain from wanton killing, and still more from torture for its own sake. The same is true of the relation between states. If that relation is one of anarchy, the statesman may have to remedy the grievances and defend the rights of his own nation by means which under an ordered system would be immoral. But this does not mean that he is free from all moral restrictions, and still less that he is morally entitled to pursue a policy of conquest and oppression for its own sake.

There is yet another truth which through confusion may seem to support the error against which I have been arguing. The statesman, so far as he is a law-maker, is concerned with laws which can be enforced; and since virtue cannot be enforced, he is not, *quâ* law-maker, concerned with the promotion of virtue. This, however, is no sound reason for supposing that in the making of laws he can be indifferent to moral considerations. On the contrary, it is his duty to make laws which are just and not unjust.

I conclude that the statesman, like every other man, ought to act in accordance with duty, and that although he has a very special duty to his own people, he may also have a duty to others. This view is in no way weakened either because we have different duties to different people, or because we have different duties in different circumstances, or because the business of law is not to enforce virtue. It is this view which we seek to express when we say that a state or nation has a moral duty towards other states and nations and that in this sense there ought to be justice among nations. But we have recognized that where there is no ordered system of law, the actual duties of statesmen, and so of nations, may be different from what they would be under an ordered system of law.

Before we leave this question of what I have called "moral justice," there is a further point to be added. Men have found that if they are to lead the moral life successfully, if they are to secure for all men the possibility of happiness and liberty and of many other things which it is our duty to seek, they must set up an ordered system of law. If men as rational beings ever find themselves in Hobbes' state of nature, their first duty is to get out of it. Moral justice demands the establishment of legal justice; and this is as

true among states as it is among individuals. It may be the case, indeed it is the case, that there are many practical difficulties in the way of this ideal. Nevertheless this ideal, the ideal of legal justice, is one which is morally binding upon us all as rational beings. It is our duty to seek it by all means in our power, whatever be the difficulties in the way. Indeed it is abundantly clear to-day that if we cannot secure legal justice among nations we may be unable to secure legal justice among individuals. The problem of securing legal justice among men and among nations is one problem and not two; and failure to secure it, or at least to do our best to secure it, is a manifest breach of our moral duty.

III

We must now turn to the problem of legal justice among nations as something which it is our moral duty to establish so far as this is within our power. I will say something later as to the content or end of such legal justice, but before we come to this it is necessary to say something about its form.

The essential characteristics of law are (1) that it should be declared and (2) that it should be enforced. In modern societies law is for the most part declared by the enactment of the legislature. It is enforced by the judiciary and the executive, particularly the police. Perhaps we may say generally that law is dependent on the government, if "the government" may be interpreted widely so as to cover the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The existence of such a government is the condition without which there can be no state.

Since legal justice depends on law, and law depends on government, it looks as if there can be no legal justice among nations unless there is a super-government and a super-state. In Hobbes' phrase, "Where there is no common power, there is no law." On this ground we may deny the existence of international law at the present time.

Such a contention, if we take "law" in its strictest sense, is probably true, but we have to remember that this is a practical question and not merely a theoretical one. From the practical point of view we have to consider what is feasible and what is not. The difficulties in the way of a world-state—and nothing but a world-state can satisfy the strictest demand for international law—are at present probably insuperable. It is true that modern inventions, such as wireless and aviation, have removed many of the difficulties which in the eighteenth century would have made the mere machinery of a world-state unworkable. But government is not merely a matter of machinery. For successful working it demands common ideals

among its subjects and a loyalty which must override all other loyalties except the ultimate loyalty to duty itself. In the present state of the world with its different cultures, different ideals, and different levels of civilization, the requisite unity and loyalty must be lacking. The ideal set forth may be one for which we ought to prepare, and to which we ought to approximate, but still not one which we ought at once to establish. It is foolish to legislate too far in advance of public opinion, and it is never the part of a wise statesman to set up an ideal system which is foredoomed to failure and subsequent reaction.

A way out of this apparent impasse may be found if we remember that in law, as in most other human affairs, there may be degrees. Law depends ultimately, not on the mere existence of a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary, but on the will of men, and without this it is nothing. We may still have something which may not improperly be called international law, if we can secure agreement as to its content and a will to enforce its observance. This may be secured with something less than a world-state provided we have some form of international organization, whether we call it a League of Nations or prefer to use some other name. Without some form of international organization we shall always under modern conditions be liable to lapse into world-anarchy and world-war.

It is not my purpose here to discuss the details of such an international organization, but it may be noted that the great difficulty to be faced is not so much the difficulty of securing agreement on the content of international law as the difficulty of securing its enforcement. The main mistake of the last twenty years was the tendency to suppose that international law could rest upon persuasion, or at any rate the failure to ensure that international law was backed by adequate force. Yet this problem is not insoluble if the statesmen and peoples of the Great Powers can be brought to recognize that the maintenance of justice and the prevention of war among nations is at once their interest and their duty, and if they can be induced to take the lead in using force in support of this ideal.

There are many who sneer at the idea of using force to restrain force and waging war to prevent war, but surely such sneers are cheap and superficial. The whole history of the world shows that civilization depends on restraining the force of the criminal by the force of the law; and the willingness to use war for the restraint of the aggressor is only a particular application of this general principle. The course here advocated may doubtless involve sacrifice, and even the sacrifice of precious lives, but the sacrifice would be small in comparison with that which arises from a policy of drift. The threat of overwhelming force may restrain the aggressor altogether; but

if it does not, at least we should be able to fight him with a just cause and widespread support. The choice before us is either to fight the aggressor, if necessary, with the force of all peace-loving nations, or to fight him alone at the time he decides to attack. It is better to fight with a League of Nations against a solitary criminal than to fight against a league of bandits as a solitary victim.

As regards the applications of these principles there may be many different opinions deserving of consideration. I have ventured to suggest that at the present stage of civilization some kind of League of Nations is practicable, and that a world-state (which would cover a really comprehensive Federal Union) is not. This, however. is a matter of opinion. What seems to me indisputable is that international law must have force behind it if it is to be of any avail, and that it is our duty to see that it receives such force.

IV

The question as to the content of legal justice among nations is more difficult. Its full treatment would demand a volume, and it is my purpose here to touch only on some of the fundamental problems which we have to face.

I assume throughout, not only that it is our moral duty to set up a system of law and order, but also that the laws enacted should aim at a justice which is not made merely by the enactment of the law. In the terminology of the earlier jurists positive or statute law should aim at the realization of natural law, the law of justice revealed to us by reason.

An attempt to describe the natural or rational justice at which legal justice should aim is beyond the scope of this paper. If we followed Plato and applied his theory to justice among nations, we should say that that system of order is just in which each nation performs its own function according to its own nature. If we followed Kant, we should say that that system is just in which each nation has freedom to act in all ways compatible with the freedom of others in accordance with universal law. Perhaps in the light of modern developments, both of government activity and of political theory, we should give a more positive content to justice than seems to be contained in the idea of freedom, though this depends to some extent on the meaning which we attach to freedom. All we need here suppose, however, is that in spite of difficulties we can often recognize what is just and what is unjust as between nations, and that further experience and reflection may enable us to clear up many doubts upon such questions.

The first task, though not the primary aim, of legal justice must

be to defend the *status quo* against aggression. This does not apply to the making of peace after war: since the aim of the aggressor is to disturb the *status quo*, he cannot claim the right to have it restored after defeat. In some circumstances it may be expedient, and perhaps even just, to restore the *status quo* which a defeated enemy has sought to disturb, but this cannot be a principle of justice: otherwise the aggressor will be encouraged, since he will be sure that if he wins, he takes everything, and if he fails to win, he loses nothing. Under the present anarchical system the making of peace after war is in any case not a judicial act. It will become so, if there were an efficient international organization, but this would raise the question of penalties for aggression.

If we confine ourselves to legal justice in peace time, it may at first sight appear strange that the *status quo* must be defended against aggression; for the *status quo* may itself be unjust. Nevertheless the principle here is simple. In an ordered system no man has a right to seek for redress of grievances except by legal processes. If he chooses to take the law into his own hands, he ought to be forcibly restrained and perhaps punished. A failure to understand this elementary principle has been the source of many of our present misfortunes.

Nevertheless the *status quo* may be unjust, and a system of law whose only aim is the maintenance of the *status quo* is doomed in the end to destruction. Indeed men may claim a moral right to find redress by force, if they cannot get it by law. The great difficulty in the establishment of international justice is that even if at the end of a war there were set up the most just state of affairs humanly possible, such a state of affairs will not continually remain just. Circumstances change and also ideals; and with these changes there arise new claims which must in the long run be justly met. The problem of meeting these claims in the international sphere is called the problem of "peaceful change"; and this is the greatest of all problems for international justice.

The problem of peaceful change can be solved, though not without difficulty, within the state so long as there is a legislature with supreme authority—provided there is a genuine and widespread desire to do justice and to set the interest of the whole above the interest of any part. Where this is lacking we get revolution, which in the state is the counterpart of war in the international sphere. It is greatly to be feared that the conditions for securing peaceful change internationally will be long in developing. They will not be solved merely by setting up some kind of machinery, whether this be a world-state or a federal union or a league of nations. They will be solved only when the minds of men are sufficiently enlightened and their wills are set to impose just changes, if necessary by force.

Here, however, we are concerned, not with machinery, nor even with the best methods for securing the enlightenment of men's minds, but rather with the principles in accordance with which justice should be applied in a changing world.

V

Let us look a little more closely into the kind of peaceful change which is necessary for any system of international justice. Many kinds of peaceful change happen by themselves; others to the advantage of all may happen by general agreement. We are concerned with that special kind of peaceful change which must be imposed, if necessary, by force, and which involves the taking of something, such as territory, from one nation and giving it to another in the name of justice.

The main difficulty here is to decide what constitutes the kind of claim which ought to be recognized by justice. There are some who hold that one important kind of claim is that which arises from the possession of a superior type of civilization, but above all from superior vigour and even from superior force. This last kind of superiority can be tested only by war; and it may be urged that here the idea of peaceful change is chimerical and is an attempt to put a stop to natural tendencies, an attempt which must in the long run end in disaster.

The answer to this is, I think, that superior civilization, vigour, and even force may be directed into other channels than those of conquest. This is what has already happened within the state. The turbulent nobles of the past may, for all I know, have complained bitterly when the strong hand of the law began to prevent them from manifesting their energy and vigour in attacks upon their neighbours. But I think we may recognize that an orderly society can provide better outlets for the exhibition of vigour and still more of civilization.

A more subtle form of the same doctrine is the plea that the vigour of a nation must receive from the law the same kinds of reward which might be attained by war, and that only so can peace be secured. If we are to maintain an ordered society, we must give to the energetic the prizes which they demand and claim to deserve. Otherwise they will simply take it for themselves.

Such a contention is only a new version of the old doctrine that justice is the interest of the stronger. It contains a certain amount of truth, if it is taken merely as a statement of fact. The wolf will always, in an imperfect human society, be more likely to get its claims considered than will the lamb; and we must recognize that a system of justice which unconsciously gives some preference to

the powerful is better than no system of justice at all. But there is all the difference in the world between a system which aims at even-handed justice, although it may not always secure it, and one which aims deliberately at securing, and even extending, the ill-gotten gains of the grasping and the powerful. If we are trying to state the ideal which we should seek, the ideal of justice is to secure that the claims of the weak may be considered as carefully as the claims of the strong. Indeed it is the weak who are most in need of the protection of the law.

Those who maintain otherwise are only elevating the principle of appeasement into a principle of justice. The principle of appeasement, as I understand it, is to give to the aggressor something of what he demands, especially if he demands it from someone weak and above all from someone other than oneself, and to do this in the hope that he will not demand any more. What a hope! The whole history of the world and the whole psychology of the individual shows that the only way to stop a bully is by standing up to him. It is politically futile, as well as morally iniquitous, to make a system of justice rest on the basis that blackmail must be made profitable. Whatever may be the concessions which human weakness and human folly may be induced to make to the aggressor, the method of concession cannot be regarded as a principle of prudence, much less of justice.

All this is said subject to the qualification that it is prudent and even just to find, if possible, some other outlet than conquest for the vigorous, even when their vigour tends to manifest itself in aggression. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the aggressiveness even of the powerful may spring, at least partly, from consciousness of being the victims of injustice.

This brings me to a further question. So far we have considered, and rejected, superior vigour and force as a ground for the claim to benefit at the expense of one's neighbours. If we are to look at the matter more positively, such a claim for justice can rest only on the fact that a nation is hampered or thwarted, relatively to its neighbours, in its attempts to live or even to live well. The claim is one for the more just distribution of goods. This must, I think, rest on needs, including the need to develop potentialities. The question is one of equity rather than one of strict justice: it calls for legislation rather than for a legal decision about existing rights.

The kind of puzzles that arise here are soluble, if at all, only by an amount of good will and mutual consideration such as is rarely found among mankind. The nature of these puzzles can best be indicated by taking a few concrete examples. What are we to say when a small country like Piedmont claims the right to free its Italian kinsmen from Austrian domination? How can we assess the claim

that a great country like Germany ought to have some, or perhaps even most, of the colonies which Great Britain has acquired far beyond her merits? How can we justify a state of affairs in which a vast island-continent is held by a handful of Australians, when we consider the needs of the teeming millions of Japan?

I am not in a position to answer such questions, but certain things may be said by way of illustrating some general principles. In doing so we must consider, not merely the ground of the claim, but also the nature of what is claimed; for this too may be just or unjust.

The first question—the question of Italian unity—is the easiest to answer. There are many who now jest at the principle of self-determination, in reaction against the view that this is a panacea for all diseases. Nevertheless the reaction is at least as foolish as even the exaggerations of the view against which it is a protest. Whatever be the limitations which may have to be imposed on the sovereignty of all states, one of the best ways of securing peace and justice in present circumstances is to see that if a large number of men of the same stock and language and tradition wish to unite in a self-governing state, they should be allowed to do so. We know only too well that there will still be difficulties about minorities and other problems, but these can be surmounted with a little good will, at least when the peoples concerned have reached a certain degree of political wisdom.

The question of the German claim to colonies is more difficult, but here the main determining principle of justice must be, not the interests of Great Britain or Germany, but the interests of the colonial people themselves. The professed aim of the British Commonwealth—and it is steadily becoming more than a mere profession—is to govern colonial peoples primarily in their own interests and with self-government as the ultimate goal. Any claim to conquer and exploit these territories because of superior virtue or superior power—and under the present regime at least this is the German claim—must be rejected as incompatible with justice. A claim to conquer and exploit civilized European countries is still more incompatible with justice.

The most difficult question of all is the question of holding a territory without being able adequately to make use of it. It is unlikely that any international system could support the Australians in their refusal to admit at least white immigrants to their country; and if it supported their refusal to admit Asiatics, this could be done only on the ground that a mixture of races is likely to be a source of trouble.

Whatever be the answer to these questions, it is abundantly clear that if such claims as those of Germany and Japan are to be refused,

something must be done to meet the genuine needs which are partly the ground of these claims. This means that an international order must secure for all nations access to raw materials, access to world markets, and perhaps also the right of immigration to certain regions, if peace and justice are to be secured. To do this the international organization, like the modern state, must extend its activities to economic questions which in the past have been thought to lie wholly outside the scope of political activity. If we are not to have frontiers changed by force, we must see to it that the existence of frontiers becomes less importnat.

No doubt it is easy for those who possess wide territories to make light of the importance of frontiers; but if a genuine attempt is made to see that the life of those whose territories are narrow is made easy and prosperous, a great step will be made towards world peace and world justice. Any system of law must be imperfect and will tend to continue the *status quo*, if the *status quo* can be made as advantageous as possible for everyone. If we look at it from the point of view of the world as a whole, a tolerable, even if imperfect, system of order and justice is incomparably better for everyone, including the real have-nots who are weak and even the clamorous have-nots who are strong, than a continual succession of bloody and devastating conflicts.

It may be objected that all this does not go to the root of the matter. Man is something more than an economic being, and what a great nation wants is not ease and prosperity, but the spreading of its civilization and ideals over a wide portion of the world. To this I can reply only that all nations should be assured not only ease and prosperity, but the right to develop their own civilization and to spread their own ideals by precept and example. If, however, they wish to do so by conquest, this is not in the interests of the world nor in the interests of justice. Measures may be adopted to enable men of all nations to take part in helping the backward peoples, but it is unlikely that a complete change of system, with all the difficulties of a new language, would be a help and not a hindrance. I believe—in spite of the present fashion of a smug superiority to smugness—that the ideals and practices, however imperfect, of the British system of colonial government are as good as any that the world has yet known, and better than any likely to be introduced by nations which have not learned by long experience and have given little evidence of political wisdom. Let us avoid "the craven fears of being great." If the appeal is to justice, then we can claim that we are making a contribution to world civilization, and that we are willing to give account of our actions before an impartial court. If the appeal is to force, then let us be prepared to fight.

VI

In discussing legal justice I have made no attempt to examine its machinery or even to enumerate the many detailed problems with which it has to deal, including justice during war (if there can be such a thing) and justice in the making of peace. I have argued only that justice must be backed by force, and that its aim must be, not merely to maintain some *status quo*, but to secure the possibility of peaceful change. And I have sought to maintain that the policy of peaceful change is not a policy of appeasing the strong, but a policy of trying to secure for all nations the conditions for living and, as far as may be, for living well.

These are very general and very elementary principles, but I believe that to think clearly about these principles is of the utmost importance at the present time, and that the absence of such clear thinking vitiates many practical discussions. The two greatest dangers to the future peace of the world are, to my mind, the reactionaries and the pacifists. The reactionaries, I find, too often meet suggestions about international organization, not with arguments, but with prejudices, sneers, and distortions. The strength of their case rests on the folly and ingenuousness of some of those idealists whom they criticize; but if this be discounted, nothing seems to me more certain—it is becoming plainer every day—than that under present conditions some form of international organization is an absolute necessity for the world. The pacifists though there are fewer of them, are in some ways a greater danger because of their appeal to the generous and to the simple. But here again nothing seems to me to be more certain than that if international justice is to be maintained, it must be maintained by a backing of superior force.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES AND ARISTOTLE

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Plato's thought on the question of the immortality of the soul, in the sense of the existence after death of an individual personality, is stated by Constantin Ritter in his book on *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy* as follows: "I must admit that for Plato personal immortality was a serious problem and that his whole exposition and especially the trend of his argument in the *Phaedo*, urges us to accept it" (page 119); and again—"The notion of immortality in the sense that we understand it, viz. the survival of personality beyond the limits of earthly existence, was for Plato a serious problem; but it never became a dogma with him, even though he gives us a strong hint in the *Phaedo* to affirm this notion" (page 301).

The object of this paper is to try to gather from the references or arguments in the dialogues in how far Ritter's opinion can be justified—viz. that for Plato personal immortality was a serious problem, and that his whole exposition urges us to accept it. I do not lay special stress on what he calls "the argument in the *Phaedo*." The "argument" in the *Phaedo*, if we understand by that the philosophical deduction of the immortality of soul, may or may not carry conviction as a proof of the proposition which it sets out to prove. But that proposition is the immortality of soul as a principle of life, not the immortality of the soul of man carrying with it as a permanent character after its separation from the body, the impress of the personality of which, through its participation in the life of the individual, it once formed a part. The assertion of personal immortality in the *Phaedo* is to be found not in argument, but in the intense conviction of Socrates himself that that day on which he was conversing with his friends was for him, not the end, but the opening of a new life. Is the expression of that conviction unique in the dialogues? or are there grounds for holding that it was an essential feature of the faith and rule of life of the Socrates through whom Plato speaks to us in the dialogues, which we may reasonably suppose him to have made his own?

The assertions about the soul in the Platonic dialogues must be distinguished accordingly as they are concerned with Soul as a general principle of life and movement or with the soul of the individual human personality. The attempts to establish the immortality of soul by a process of philosophic argument such as we find in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*—verbal

and unconvincing as most of them are—do not in any case touch the problem of personal immortality. They deal with Soul as a general or universal principle. Even the assertion of immortality which we find in the *Meno* as the basis of the doctrine of recollection (ἀνάμνησις) does not necessarily carry a belief in personal immortality. True, the soul comes to its new incarnation with recollections of knowledge gained by it in former incarnations on earth and in its existence in the after-death world. But it comes with no memory of its previous life on earth and no conscious link with a former personality. Soul, as the universal principle of life and motion, is eternal and immortal. It is the prime mover in the universe (*Laws*, 896). It is the source of that order which governs all existing things according to the teaching of the wise ones (*Gorgias*, 508) who tell us that heavens and earth and Gods and men are held together by co-operation, friendship, goodness, control, and justice.

But, at the same time, in the soul of man, or at any rate of those persons whose nature is fitted to receive it, there is an element which belongs to this world Soul and is in its essence divine. In the earthly life of the human personality this element is bound up with the bodily elements, which bring it into association with physical weakness, with the appetites and pleasures of the flesh. Indulgence in these darkens its view, weighs down its natural aspirations (*Rep.*, 519), so that it appears to be confined in the body as in a prison (*Phaedrus*, 250), or even—to adopt the Orphic language of the mystics—in a tomb. But its true life is in contemplation of the eternal realities to which it is akin (*Rep.*, 490), and the true education of the human soul is its conversion (περιαγωγή) through philosophy, by which it rises through the darkened lights of the sensible world to the upward way leading to truth and reality. Hence the struggle and conflict of man's life—the unsatisfied longing for something beyond the reach of change, the pains as of child-birth in which the divine element seeks to attain and to perpetuate itself in its true environment. Not till then can the soul truly live and grow and find ease for its pains. This is the language of the *Phaedrus* and of the wise woman Diotima in the *Symposium*—highly figurative but deeply significant. Socrates in the *Phaedo*, in the mood of spiritual exaltation in which he spends his last hours on earth, rises to a height of ascetic renunciation which is not found elsewhere in, and is not characteristic of, the dialogues. He declares that for the philosopher—and by that name we must understand not merely the scholar or the student, but the man whose soul seeks, and is in contact with, the true and abiding realities—death is the door to the true life. For him life on earth is, at its best, a rehearsal of death, an interval for the immortal element to practise and habituate itself to separation from its bodily environment until such time as, in the

providence of God, the actual separation takes place and it can go out free.

This, as has been suggested above, is, from the normal point of view of the dialogues, perhaps an overwrought picture of the place of the soul in its human abode. But it raises acutely the question on which, as Ritter has said, Plato expresses no dogmatic opinion. As what does it go out? Does it go out bearing the imprint of the personality of Socrates—all that it had made its own during the life of the mind which it ruled in him? Or does it go to be merged in the divine soul of the World, leaving with the perishing bodily remains all trace or memory of the life it led in Socrates, uninfluenced by experiences gained there in trials and overcomings as the man, under its guidance, grew away from the passing shows and calls of the body to a vision of the truly real and good? That is the question. Socrates, in the *Phaedo*, as he waits for death at the setting of the sun, has no doubt as to the answer. He will go as Socrates. He laughs when Krito asks what they are to do about his funeral. *He* will not be there, but away where they will never catch him. With the body they can do as they please. He is done with it. That. of course, is the confident expression of the faith of an individual. But the questing reason of mankind seeks for something more. Is there anything, it asks, in the order of nature as far as we have come to know it, or in the essential characteristics of human thought and will, on which a rational base for this faith can be founded?

The contrast between the two claims, on the one side for the immortality of Soul as the divine life principle of the Universe in which the element which inspires the human personality is merged at death, and on the other, for the immortality of the particular soul, retaining its divine affinities but carrying with it, when it leaves the body, an imprint of the personality in which it lived, is well expressed by Professor Pringle Pattison in his book on *The Idea of Immortality*. The former, in which all desire for individual survival fades away in contemplation of the eternal, is set out as follows:

"By whatever gate a man may enter, the eternal foundations of the world are there discovered to him, and he knows that in his hold on these realities lies all that is worth striving for, all that is of value in his life. The being of these realities and his own relation to them 'stand sure' beyond the risks of time and change, even the change which we call death. He who has tasted eternal life is not wont to be troubled in heart about the question of his personal survival; for such survival would mean nothing to him, if he were separated from the object in which he has found his true life. His immortality lies for him in his union with the eternal object on which his affections are set, and he seeks no other assurance" (page 147).

The latter, in which the personal soul refuses to accept the idea of annihilation, is as follows:

"The man, the concrete individual can be adequately or properly described only in terms of personality or character—by reference to his dispositions and affections, his interests and ideals. Beside these, the bodily facts, as such, sink into insignificance, dear and familiar as they are as elements in the whole. And instead of being an intermittent and evanescent accompaniment of organic processes, the spiritual self created through the bodily medium, is seen to achieve a unity and identity more complete and more permanent than can belong to any non-self-conscious being. It is, indeed, only the self-conscious spirit—a being who can make himself his own object and contemplate himself as a self—that attains individuality and independence in an ultimate sense. Every other being is, as it were, a channel of the Universal Will; but man, as self-conscious, can distinguish himself even from his Maker, and set his own will against the divine. Is it, then, unreasonable to conclude that an individuality so real, and the goal apparently of an age-long process, must be capable of surviving the dissolution of the material frame through which it was brought into being? The body, ceasing to be a living body, may relapse into its elements when it has 'fulfilled' itself, while the true individual, in which that fulfilment consisted, pursues his destiny under new conditions" (page 105).

Discussions on the immortality of the soul in the Platonic dialogues come under three heads. First, there are the passages in which Socrates sets out to establish it as a philosophic doctrine as, for example, in the *Republic*, in the *Phaedo*, in the *Phaedrus*, and in the *Laws*. In the *Republic* the reasoning proceeds on the principle (assumed for the sake of the argument) that everything in nature which is destructible dies or is destroyed by some particular evil or defect peculiar to it. Now the form of evil peculiar to the soul is injustice, and as the presence of injustice in the soul admittedly does not cause its death, nothing else can. In the *Phaedo* the argument is that the soul is soul by virtue of the presence of the Form or principle of life. Now things which are what they are by the presence of, or participation in, one Form, cannot admit the presence of a contrary Form, and as Death is the contrary of Life, the soul cannot admit the presence of death and therefore as such is immortal. The other argument, which we find in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, is that soul is the self-mover and as such the prime cause of all motion and change. Therefore it cannot cease to be, for there is no other source of motion which can interfere with it.

It is not necessary here to attempt an estimate of the philosophic value of these lines of argument. Some of them are open to obvious criticisms which we cannot suppose Plato to have overlooked. The

doctrine of soul as the source of motion is fundamental alike to the theology of the *Laws* and the cosmology of the *Timaeus*. But the conclusions to which these arguments lead do not extend to proof of the survival of individual personality. They are directed to the immortality of Soul rather than of the soul.

The second type of discussion on immortality is in the *Myths*, which in certain dialogues—the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedo*—are brought in to wind up the argument which is the ground theme of all the Socratic dialogues, viz. that the supreme duty of man is the care of the soul, and the moral life through which alone that is possible. The root question of his various interlocutors is "Why should I be moral? Why put any restraint on my desires for wealth, power, pleasure?" Socrates, after having reduced their arguments to silence or involved them in hopeless contradictions, as if he realized in his heart that reasoned argument is not enough, takes refuge in the *Myth*, in which he depicts the life of the soul after death has released it from its body. These myths all assume the survival of the soul, not as a pure divine essence, but having imprinted on it the character, good or evil, which it formed or allowed to be formed during its life in the body. As such it has to appear before the judgement seat and receive the award of a divinely instituted tribunal.

Socrates is made to put forward the myth with due reserve—as a parable or an allegory which, while not to be literally believed, still contains an inner core of truth. In the *Phaedo* he says that to maintain dogmatically that these things really are as he has described them would not be reasonable for a man of sense, but that this or something like it is true in respect of our souls and their dwelling places, seeing that we regard the soul as an immortal thing, seems a reasonable view to hold. It is worth while to take the risk—a noble risk (*Phaedo*, 114.d). The implication is that belief in personal immortality necessarily impels men to formulate some doctrine as to the life after death, and, in default of any knowledge of its conditions, they take refuge in such imaginary pictures as seem to afford the best attainable expression to their belief. They 'take the risk—the noble risk,' walking by faith in what they cannot prove. People may scoff, as he says in the *Gorgias*, at these pictures of the after life as nothing but an old wives' tale, and so they might well do if by any sort of inquiry we could have discovered any better or truer doctrine (*Gorgias*, 587.a).

In the *Gorgias*, after having made profession of his faith that the good man has no cause to fear any wrongs he may suffer on earth, not even death itself, but that the one thing a man should dread is passing to the other world with a soul laden with the effects of evil deeds, Socrates offers to the unbelieving Callicles a reasoned exposi-

tion of it (λόγος). Callicles, he says, may regard it as a mere fiction (μῦθος) but he (Socrates) gives it as a reasoned account. What he is going to describe, he says, are things that really exist (523.a). Then follows the account of the three Judges of the underworld who sit in the meadow at the parting of the ways, before whom the soul appears, bearing all the marks of good or evil which it brings with it from its earthly life, stripped of all the trappings of wealth or power or high place under which its misdeeds were concealed on earth, or of the low estate in which its good life passed unnoticed. This is the tradition of final judgement which, in one form or another, is characteristic of every doctrine of personal immortality. Socrates hands it on in the form in which he has received it and believes it to be true (ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοῶς πιστέυω ἀληθῆ εἶναι) (524.b).

In the *Republic* we have the story (μῦθος) of Er, the son of Armenius, an elaborate eschatology, which tells of judgement after death, of retribution for good or evil, and the return of the soul, after its allotted period of purgation, to another life on earth (614.b). Socrates does not offer this as anything more than a tale, but it is one, he says, which has been saved from destruction and which will save us if we believe it. We shall keep our souls clean from the stain of wrong-doing, and so live in peace with ourselves and with the Gods, both here on earth, and when as victors we obtain the prize (621.d).

Together with these myths or allegories of the future state of the soul may be considered the discourse of Socrates in the *Symposium* in praise of Love. To equate the terms "myth" and "allegory" may seem open to objection. There is much point in Professor Cornford's distinction (Plato's *Cosmology*, page 32) that "an allegory, like a cypher, has a key; the *Pilgrim's Progress* can be re-translated into the terms of Bunyan's theology. But there is no key to poetry or myth." With all allowance for that, however, it seems to me that the eschatological myths of the dialogues are more allegorical in character and intention than purely poetical. There is a key, and the key is the belief in the doctrine of personal immortality, and in the reality of a life beyond death, which can only be described or illustrated by translation from the imaginative picture. From this point of view the discourse of the Mantinean woman Diotima, which Socrates professes to reproduce in the *Symposium*, is more of an allegory than a myth in the ordinary sense.

The discourse of Diotima is based on the principle that the supreme desire of all animate beings is immortality. In the physical world this desire finds expression in reproduction, in mother love, and in care for the young, by which the mortal individual strives to perpetuate its kind. In the soul of man there is the same urge. Sometimes a man will try to satisfy it by leaving some lasting memorial of his work as lawgiver or statesman or poet. But the truly philosophic soul will be

led by Love—an intermediary between Gods and men—to seek to bring its offspring to birth in a vision of beauty. That beauty he will discern in lovely bodies, in beauty of conduct, and in other objects that offer themselves to his apprehension. But he will not rest till he has attained to vision of Beauty itself, eternal and unchanging, by virtue of which all other manifestations of the beautiful come to be. In that attainment the soul of man will find its satisfaction and will bring to birth the spiritual virtues of which it has been pregnant, and will enter into friendship with God and such immortality as man can have (*Symposium*, 201–212).

It is important for us to try to arrive at a true conception of the significance of these mythical or allegorical pictures. It seems clear that, even where Socrates is made to assert that he is offering an account of things that actually exist, that he believes the story to be true and not a mere fanciful tale, we are not to suppose that he means us to accept as literal truth his descriptions of the underworld. We are not even committed to think that he regarded his soul after death as inhabiting some portion of the physical world localized in space and time. These are the material trappings of the picture, suiting it to our human capacity for understanding what is in reality not demonstrable. He claims truth for his visions of the unseen in the sense that we must order our lives as if they were true, unless we can find some vision of the after-life which fulfils more adequately the demands of faith and the tests of reason (*Gorgias*, 527.a). The point is that there must be some such vision if we are to maintain belief in the immortality of the soul, as a divine element in a human, personality. The Myth is offered, not as the ground of such a belief but as a necessary product of it.

The question may be raised as to what place is to be assigned to these myths or allegories in any attempted exegesis of a Platonic philosophy. Are they merely a reminiscence of a method of discussion characteristic of Socrates? Similar questions are raised in regard to other philosophical doctrines enunciated or adumbrated in the dialogues. Are they to be understood as the thoughts of Plato himself or as incidental to a biographical picture of Socrates? These questions, in so far as they contemplate the drawing of a definite line, between what in the dialogues is to be considered as Socratic and what Platonic, do not seem to me to admit of answer. That Socrates was popularly regarded as holding unusual views about the life of the soul in the underworld may be inferred from the allusion, in the *Birds of Aristophanes* (1553), to the unwashed Socrates shepherding souls by the lake among the Shadowfeet. So in the *Clouds* the description of the Socratic disciples as pallid barefoots (103) and the greeting of Strepsiades by Socrates as "creature of a day" (223), point to a popular reputation of Socrates as professing an other-

worldly outlook in which the daily interests of the ordinary man were of small account. But an attempt to allocate the Myth as a Socratic rather than a Platonic exposition will lead us no further than similar attempts to isolate the Socratic elements in the doctrine of the Forms, as it appears in the dialogues, or in the scheme of philosophic education in the *Republic*.

Besides, but akin to, the myths, which show obvious signs of Orphic influence, there are passages in the dialogues in which Orphic phrases and similes are used in terms which indicate at least sympathetic understanding. In the *Republic* we have the well-known denunciation of the Orphic creed in its popular debasements (363.c, etc.). But elsewhere the Socratic conception of the relation of the soul to its bodily environment finds a close parallel in some of the Orphic imagery. For example, in the *Gorgias* (492.c) he suddenly breaks in upon the course of the argument by suggesting that Euripides may be right when he says—"Who knows whether our life be really death and to die is to be alive?" He himself has heard it from the wise ones that we, while alive in the body, are really dead, and that the body is the tomb of the soul (σῶμα σῆμα). This is the typical language of the Orphic, as is also the analogy which he proceeds to draw between the fate of the soul which lives in the pursuit of pleasure and the pierced cask being filled by the sieve. Even where the actual Orphic phraseology is not employed, the picture of the soul as entombed in the body is hardly distinguishable from that which Socrates draws in the *Phaedo* of the true philosopher's life being a rehearsal or practising of death, and an impatient waiting for the complete liberation of the soul which death alone can bring. Again, the picture in the *Republic* (611.d) of the condition of the soul while subjected to the stains and pollutions of the body likened to the old man of the sea whose real form is hidden under a crust of shells and sea growths, is strongly suggestive of Orphic influence. The reference in the *Meno* (81.a and c) is probably to doctrines of an Orphic origin. There Socrates says that he has listened to men and women who are wise in divine knowledge, to priests and priestesses who have made themselves competent by study to give an account of these things, to Pindar and others of the poets who have been divinely inspired. What they say is that the soul of man is immortal—has its endings—which we call death—and its re-birth, but is never destroyed, and this is why in this life we must strive to attain the utmost measure of goodness.

The third source from which may be drawn indications of a belief in personal immortality, and one of special interest, is found in what one may call casual references in the dialogues, introduced without any doctrinal statement, or any "philosophic" proof, to a belief in personal immortality as a necessary, or at least an implied, sanction

for the claims of the life of moral goodness as the supreme interest for man.

In the *Krito* (54.b) Socrates is reasoning with his friend Krito against the proposal that he should take the opportunity offered to him of escaping from prison and evading the sentence of death which had been passed upon him. He pictures the Athenian laws coming to him in person to protest against his doing violence to their judgement against him, and as a last resort they appeal to the life after death—what reception, they say, can he expect when he arrives in the after-world from the laws which rule there if he has flouted their brothers on earth? In the *Republic* (496.d) we have the picture of the philosopher in the turmoil of political strife in which the life of the ordinary citizen is spent. In that environment the philosopher is like a man who has fallen in a den of wild beasts. He cannot join in the struggle, because its methods and objects are repellent to him. He is not strong enough to stand up alone against the mob in defence of what to him is the true way of life. All that is left to him is to withdraw into his own world, like a man taking shelter from a storm, content if somehow he can live out his time here, clear from sin and wrong-doing, and pass out from it cheerful and in good heart with a noble hope. The life to come of the soul is held out as the fitting crown to a life rightly spent here, and the life here as the opportunity for preparing for the life beyond (498.c and d). "Looking a little time ahead, are you not?" says Adeimantus. "Not worth counting," says Socrates, "if you look to the whole."

In the myth of the *Republic* the souls, when they have completed their cycle in the underworld, come up to select the life in which they are to pass their next incarnation. Then it is that the choice which a man makes on earth between material pleasures and advancements on the one hand, and righteousness and justice on the other, is seen in its true bearing on the eternal welfare of the soul. Right living on earth is only possible to the man who has learned that, in comparison with justice and goodness, all that the world has to offer is vanity. He must therefore meet death holding unflinchingly to that conviction, so that when, in the underworld, the soul has to make its choice for another incarnation, it may not be dazzled by prospects of wealth or power or high estate, but may choose with discernment the only type of life which can offer the possibility of real happiness (619.a, etc.). It passes into the other world with no other belongings but the education and nurture which it has received on earth (*Phaedo*, 107.d). In a memorable passage in the *Theaetetus* (176–177) Socrates is contrasting the two ways of life—that of justice and righteousness on the one side, and of self-seeking and wrong-doing on the other. Evil, he says, must necessarily exist in this mortal world of ours, but it can have no place in the divine nature. We must therefore strive to

escape as soon as possible from this scene of evil to the other, where it is not. The way of escape is making ourselves like to God, and that is living a life of justice and righteousness, with right thinking. The other way of life may bring a man fame and reputation among those who do not know better, or have the same inclinations, but it carries with it its own punishment in growing debasement and evil associations, and when he dies he will find no entrance to that other world where there is no taint of evil. As he says in the *Gorgias* (522.e), a man who is not a hopeless fool or coward has no fear of death in itself. What he does fear is wrong-doing, because for the soul to enter the other world burdened with a mass of iniquities—that is the worst of all possible disasters. These references are enough to show that, in the Platonic dialogues, the assessment of the true value of the good life is not to be reached by computation of the rewards or punishments of our life on earth. Much as we may learn from our experience here as to the essential rightness of the good life, the supreme sanction must be looked for beyond the temporal scene. The soul of man, when it leaves the mortal body, passes to a stage where, stripped of all material trappings, its aims and attainments are valued in the light of the eternal verities.

In the Platonic dialogues we find the origin of that branch of philosophical inquiry which, since Aristotle, has been known as Metaphysics. They did not attempt to teach or to expound a definite philosophic doctrine. What they did effect was to set the mind of man on a new line of thought by persistently putting the question—What is it? What is the real being behind the appearances which the senses disclose to us? The answer cannot be found by looking for material causes, with which previous inquirers had been content. The answer which gradually emerges in the dialogues is the conception of the Form, which, itself eternal and unchanging, is in some way manifested in the perpetual flux of coming to be and perishing of the material world. By virtue of this manifestation or participation, the individual appearances become intelligible, related to the reality, and, as such, subjects of knowledge to the mind which has learned to look behind the veil of appearances to the reality which is apprehensible only by the reasoning mind. The doctrine is not fully or systematically worked out. The difficulties of its application are admitted as, for example, in the *Parmenides*. It was left to Aristotle to attempt the systematic search for "substance"—a something which, having its own independent existence, should provide a permanency in thought underlying the qualities or attributes which are the material of our sensible experience. With Aristotle the inquiry laid the foundation of what we now call Logic and Metaphysics. In the Platonic dialogues the interest is still mainly ethical. In the search for reality the argument, in the end, comes to the need

for the care of the soul, to the methods of education by which it can be turned away from fleeting and unsatisfying sensible and material interests and pleasures to contemplation of the eternal realities which are its true home. The soul is the soul of the individual man, and the all-important thing for him is to preserve it from immersing itself in the fleeting world of time and losing its heritage in the other, in which alone it can attain to the vision of truth, beauty, and goodness. That we do not find any detailed picture of the state of the soul after death, apart from the fanciful scenes of the myth, that we are not asked to conceive an existence for it in a world of time and space analogous to its existence on earth, must not be regarded as proof that in the Platonic dialogues the bodily death is considered as the end for the soul of its individual being.

That (to use Ritter's words) the doctrine of personal immortality "never became for Plato a dogma" is certainly true. There is indeed no dogmatic doctrine in the dialogues, or in any known writing of Plato. But that (again in Ritter's words) "his whole exposition urges us to accept it" seems to me an irresistible conclusion. The dialogues in which Socrates plays a leading part cannot be adequately interpreted as purely biographical. If we cannot, through them, read the mind of Plato, it is all but a closed book to us. He tells us in Epistle II and also in Epistle VII, both of which are now generally accepted as genuine, that on the higher matters of philosophy he had not committed, and never would commit, his thoughts to writing. What were passing as his were the thoughts of Socrates grown beautiful and young (II.314.c). But this transformation to beauty and youth came through a mind which was not merely a mirror of the thoughts and sayings of the old Socrates, but a rich soil in which they took root and grew like the mustard seed of the parable. And so, in the dialogues, we are justified in finding, on the question of personal immortality, more than a record of the unshaken conviction of Socrates. They can only be rightly understood in the light of the acceptance by Plato of a belief which, while it could not be established by any reasoned deduction, lay at the root of his conception of man as a moral and intellectual being.

If we turn from the dramatic and poetic atmosphere of the dialogues to the abstract and scientific method in which Aristotle treats of the nature of the soul, we find an entirely different outlook. There is no dominating personal interest, no room for imaginative flights to carry us beyond the limits of reasoned observation.

In his treatise on the soul, usually cited as the *De Anima*, he defines soul as the principle of life in an organic body, the primary grade of actuality of a natural organized body—that in which a particular body capable of life is realized and is itself. All living things, plants and animals alike, thus possess soul-capacities in

varying degrees—nutritive, appetitive, sensory, locomotive, thinking. In all these there is a natural impulse to attain, as far as is compatible with their state of development, to the eternal and divine. This finds expression in the urge manifested in each grade to reproduce its kind. The individual life is limited in time, so it strives as the chief end of its existence, to perpetuate itself by creating others of its kind to take its place. Thus soul, from its most primitive embodiments, has in it an affinity to something beyond its material environment, and that affinity finds expression in the impulse towards the eternal and the divine as the end to which all their natural functions are directed. In the soul of man, however—or at any rate, of some men—there is present an element which is eternal and divine, not in its aspiration towards such an end, but, so to speak, in its own right. In man, as in the lower grades of organic life, there is the soul which actuates each individual in appetite, desire, sense-perception, locomotion. It is bound up with the bodily organs, through which it operates, and perishes with them. But there is also in his soul the element of thought and that is a different kind of soul (413.b). It is separable from the other functions and from the bodily organs and is indestructible. This is the element which he calls mind (*νοῦς*)—something specially divine in its nature, not susceptible to extrinsic modification, something which seems to be implanted in us (408.b), to have come in from outside and to be solely a divine element (*De Gen. Anim.* II.3. 736). It is by nature the primary and authoritative element (*De Anima*, 410.b).

This divine element has two aspects—theoretic, which is concerned with abstract thought and knowledge, and practical, which governs movement and conduct by reference to desirable ends and purposive action. The activities of the latter are bound up with the conduct of the ordinary finite life of man, though, as will be seen, not without relation to the realization of a divine purpose. The former is the faculty of thought in itself. As such it is impassible (*ἀπαθὲς*), not susceptible to change from without, but capable of receiving the Form which is the subject of knowledge (*δεκτικὸν τοῦ εἰδοῦς*). It is, therefore, potentially identical with the real nature of the object of thought, and consequently an object of thought to itself in self-consciousness. It has no existence as a separate thing, but only in the actuality of its thinking. As the hand is the master tool, seeing that it is the user of all other tools, so mind in this aspect is the Form of Forms (432).

But here again is a distinction the exact interpretation of which is not easy to determine—the distinction of mind as passive or receptive and mind as creative. This distinction, which is the subject of Chapter 5 of Book III, is introduced as analogous to the distinction in our apprehension of objects between the matter which is the

potentiality of the thing, in which it takes shape and form, and the cause which brings the potentiality to being as an actual object. Mind, therefore, if we apply this analogy, is what it is, in the one aspect by becoming or being potentially all things which are capable of being objects of thought, and in the other aspect by virtue of making all things in its capacity for realizing them as objects of thought. In this sense it is like light, which brings what are potentially colours into actuality as colours. The passive mind is, in potentiality, all the objects of thought. Thinking is the bringing into actuality something potentially intelligible in the object. Mind and the objects of thought are thus in a sense the same. They become the same when their potentiality is made actual by active or creative mind.

So far, active or creative mind would seem to be a function of the divine mind or God which, in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle is led to envisage as the ultimate source of reality and of movement, living in activity of thought of which itself is the unique object, and moving all things as the unique centre of desire. As such it might seem difficult to place it as a function or element of the soul of man. But in the course of this condensed and difficult exposition we find interposed an explanation of why, although this element is immortal and indestructible, it brings to the individual soul no recollection of previous existence (430.a). The explanation would seem to be that mind in its passive aspect is destructible, and in its destruction the equipment necessary to memory perishes. Whatever the meaning may be, even if the words are intended merely as a summary dismissal of the Platonic doctrine of recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*), the interposition of these words must have reference to the function of the mind as creative mind in the soul of man. The problem remains as to what precise relation is intended. Mind in this aspect is a faculty peculiar to man and not even to all men (404.b). This recalls the saying of Plato that the natures which are fitted to become truly philosophic, i.e. to attain to a conception of truth and reality, are rarely found among men and few in number (*Rep.*, 491.b). But we find it described as something divine, independent of and separable from the destructible elements of the soul, and yet as dependent in the exercise of thought on the sense perceptions of these elements (432.a). If this apparent anomaly is resolved by the distinction of the active and the passive aspects of mind, what is the relation of the former to the individual human soul?

The discussion in the *De Anima* gives us no guide to a solution of this question. But elsewhere in Aristotle's philosophy we find that between the divine mind and the mind of man there is not an unbridgeable gulf. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* he has to consider the demands of the practical reason, and here, as in the Platonic dia-

logues, the ultimate sanction for right conduct is found to rest on considerations beyond the mortal and material existence of man. Just as in soul, as the principle of life in the lower stages of life, there is that affinity with what is eternal and divine which urges the individual creature to seek continued existence by perpetuation of its kind, so the divine element of mind in the soul of man, where it is present, seeks its satisfaction in overcoming the temporal limitations of his life by guiding him towards immortality. If, Aristotle argues, mind is a divine element in relation to man, a life guided by mind will be an alignment towards the divine of human desires and activities. We must, therefore, follow that guidance, not as mortal creatures limiting our thoughts to a mortal scope, not being content as men with a purely human outlook, but aspiring, as far as our human faculties allow, to an immortal prospect. For each creature that way of life is best and happiest which is most in keeping with its nature, and so for man is the life controlled by mind (*Nic. Ethics*, Book V, chap. 7). That the striving for immortality, so far as our human nature allows, is the supreme end and happiness for the man who has followed the divine element in him and has lived in the pursuit of truth, we find enunciated at the conclusion of the *Timaeus* (90.c)—a dialogue, by the way, in which Socrates is merely an onlooker. The fact that this belief, so impressively announced in the Aristotelian *Ethics*, is expressed in almost identical language in one of the latest of the Platonic dialogues, is a striking indication of the survival in Aristotle's treatment of the ultimate problems of metaphysics and ethics, of the spirit of the Platonic teaching. This mind element, though in mass it be but a small part of us, yet in power and value it far surpasses all the rest, and indeed would seem to constitute our true self (1178.a). It would be therefore quite unreasonable that our way of life should be governed, not by that but by some alien element.

We are still left with the last question in regard to this divine element in the soul of man, which is stated to be his real self, which leads him to the highest expression of his nature in assimilation to what is eternal and divine. What becomes of it when by death it is released from association with the destructible elements of the soul? This question, in its form, assumes for the mind continued existence in the time series. Life for man is a passage in time. We cannot form a conception of life in any other aspect. In thinking of the life of the soul we regard death as an incident in the time series, with a before and after, and we speculate as to the after. We cannot picture to ourselves any life for the individual soul after death except under conditions of time, whether here on earth, in reincarnation, or in some imagined non-terrestrial scene. Under the veil of the myth Plato avoids a direct answer to the question. For Aristotle, as would

appear, the mind element in the human souls in which it has entered is not limited by the time series in which the soul lives. It is separable, unmixed, impassive, indestructible. It functions in and through the perishable elements, but is itself divine. As such, it is the ruling element and brings into the human soul something more than human. It inspires, indeed requires, the man, acting in and through the merely human soul, to live in contemplation and pursuit of objects beyond the range of merely human interests, beyond the limited sphere of his human and mortal life. Thereby the man in his human life becomes dear (*προσφιλὴς*) to the Gods and enjoys their blessed life in so far as his nature allows. Does all this aspiration towards the eternal and divine perish at the death of the individual, together with the bodily elements from which it urged him to escape? Does the mind, the divine element, carry away with it no association of its life in the human soul? Apparently not, if it is wholly impassive. In the lower organisms, in which the urge towards the eternal and divine is their main purpose (*τέλος*), the individual perishes, but achieves a vicarious immortality in the perpetuation of his kind. The man, in his merely human activities, shares and gives effect to this physical urge for perpetuation. But for that purpose of his being which is directly controlled and ordered by the divine element within him, which stretches out his effort beyond what is merely human and mortal, there is apparently no satisfaction except to strain after an immortality (*ἀθανατίζειν*) which is by his nature unattainable. At his death the effort perishes, and the divine element escapes, retaining no trace of the personality which it formed and directed.

While in Aristotle there is no discussion of or direct reference to the question of personal immortality, his thought on the nature of the soul is a direct development of what we find in the dialogues of Plato. In both we have the basic conception of a divine power, expressed as Mind, the source of life and motion and of the order in which the Universe is ruled. In both there is the conception of Good as the end or goal towards which man and all forms of organic life aspire. Even in the lower forms of existence, as Aristotle says (*Eth. Nic.*, 1173.a), there seems to be some natural good higher than their own faculties which leads them to seek the good for which they are fitted. Both again hold that, in the soul of man, or in any case of men whose nature admits of it, this divine element is consciously present in the faculty of thought (cf. with the references on page 23, Plato *Republic*, 518 D–E), separate from those functions of the soul which are bound up with bodily activities. In both we see this divine element as the governing power in the soul of man, controlling the bodily desires and emotions, directing his conduct towards the attainment of truth and enduring goodness. Both again,

for the supreme sanction of the highest life for man, require him to look beyond the interests of his human life, and not limit his consideration by the conditions of a mortal creature.

Professor Pringle Pattison, in his book on *The Idea of Immortality* already quoted, holds that, in the passages of the *Ethics* referred to above, Aristotle is not thinking of a future state, but of an eternal or deathless life which can be lived by us here and now, the life of thought which makes us spectators of all time and all existence, to which we can raise ourselves, at intervals at any rate, out of the flux of time with its passing interests and distractions (page 40). But the obstinate question remains. How is it possible that a being whose life is bounded in time, for whom, after a few years, annihilation is inevitable, should find his highest expression in the thought which is timeless? How does an element which is divine, eternal, impassive, find lodgement in and association with the mortal organism, which has in it nothing that can survive the death of the material body? To this question Aristotle has no answer.

Are we justified in expecting an answer? We ask for an answer because of the demand for or belief in its immortality which is, in one form or another, characteristic of the human soul. This is not to be dismissed merely as a case of wishful thinking. However crudely it may be expressed, it is the voice of a revolt of the human spirit against accepting a destiny offering it nothing beyond the annihilation or reduction to a lower form of organization which the bodily elements undergo on death. It is an assertion of the presence in us of something which will not rest content with merely material satisfactions. It is a protest against the thought that all our spiritual aspirations, all the joy of intellectual achievement, all the elevation above material environment which comes to us in the contemplation of beauty in art, or nature, or the supreme possession of music, all the assurance of eternity in the intensity of love and friendship, in the triumph over tragic misfortune, are mere illusion as against the unresponsive negation with which the exigencies of our temporal life confront us. It is most strongly asserted in those "intervals" mentioned by Professor Pringle Pattison, in which we "raise ourselves out of the flux of time," or in those states described in the Platonic dialogues when the soul, freeing itself from the clogs of material desires and pleasures, rises to contemplation of the eternal world of truth and beauty. These "intervals" come to us normally not in a state of trance, but in moments of intense self-consciousness, when the individual self realizes itself in a way of escape from temporal limitations. They carry with them for the soul a reinforcement of the assurance that it is more than its material environment and does not perish with it.

For Plato the soul of the true philosopher—and again we must

warn the reader against understanding the word in the technical sense of its modern connotation—lives in contemplation of all time and all being (*Rep.*, 486). Therefore death to him is nothing to fear. It is an incident in time and to his emancipated soul the outlook is not limited to the temporal flux.

But, while we cannot suppress the question, we must not look for a dogmatic answer, for the reason that we cannot project ourselves beyond the time series in which we live, to envisage another form of existence. The rule of life which is the dominant motive of the Platonic dialogues, implies, as I understand it, belief in a life beyond death of the human personality in its highest manifestation, but a belief which cannot be substantiated by any reach of the human reason. We have therefore to rest content in a purely imaginative picture, such as may be most acceptable to our individual conceptions. For futher assurance, we must look to religion, with its divinely inspired and guaranteed revelation.

Christian orthodoxy has rejected the Greek conception of immortality, and adopted the Jewish doctrine of resurrection. According to that, the souls of the dead, each with its individual body, transformed in some spiritual metamorphosis, are recalled to life and judgement when this temporal dispensation is brought to an end. That that last day was expected to be imminent, made it less necessary to speculate on the state of the soul and body awaiting after death the awakening of the resurrection. St. Paul proclaims it as a mystery (Corinthians i. 15) and to-day, when the Church in its creed declares the resurrection of the body, the mystery is correspondingly more profound. But the difference between the two conceptions is clear cut. To the Greek philosopher the soul is immortal by virtue of its being in itself divine—a phase or portion (not by material partition) of the divine mind, which is the life and governing power of the Universe. For the Christian theology, the soul in its body is a separate individual creation, subject to the primal curse of death, but brought back to life by the power of God in resurrection on the last day to receive judgement for its course on earth. In either case the human reason, working, as it must, in and through the time series, is brought to a standstill in its attempts to establish an individual personal life for the immortal element in man. In the Platonic dialogues we are brought up to the myth, which, for want of better, we accept as if it or something like it must be true. Religion offers us a divine revelation. In either case the answer to the question is found in faith—the "noble hope" which inspires Socrates, or that faith in revealed truth which is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not attainable by our understanding.

As Socrates says in *Phaedo* (85.d), all that a man can do is to

adopt the best and least assailable doctrine that our human reason can produce, and commit ourselves to that, as to a raft, in our voyage through life, unless we may be able to find in some divine doctrine a steadier craft on which we may with more safety and assurance make the passage.

The question has been raised whether, from the accounts in the dialogues of the life of the soul after death, we are to conclude that Plato had adopted the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, i.e. that the individual soul after release from a human body may, after prescribed periods of time, be reincarnated in another human body, or even in an animal body. If this question is directed at ascertaining the personal beliefs of Plato, it does not seem to me to be susceptible of an answer. The philosophy of the dialogues which are relevant to this question is that of the Platonic Socrates, and, whatever may be the case as regards other doctrines discussed in them, attempts to disentangle the personalities here lead to no definite result. On this question individual readers and commentators will differ, both as to the available evidence for affirming such a distinction, and as to the need for making the attempt.

But it is useful to consider whether, in the dialogues, we find sufficient material for affirming, in the mind of the Platonic Socrates, a belief in the transmigration of souls. It is almost entirely in the various myths that the material, such as it is, is to be found. In them we have various accounts of the life of the soul after its separation from the body in death. These are presented as a projection into the future of the time-conditioned existence which the soul has led on earth, as a description of scenes in which it takes part or surroundings in which it lives. We are expressly warned not to take them literally as a description of actual happenings. On the other hand, they are not to be dismissed as mere fairy tales. They are intended, under cover of a myth or tale about the underworld, to convey thoughts on the nature of the immortal element in man, and its relation to his life on earth, as a being in whom this divine element is bound into a mortal body.

The myth or tale in its frame is naturally a reflector of current religious beliefs or philosophical doctrines, with no claim to objective validity. The purpose is served if it leads us to apprehend dimly, as in a mystery, a kernel of meaning, by which we may regulate our life on earth as if it were only the prelude to a fuller reality beyond.

The dominant themes are judgement and reincarnation, but the details cannot be fitted into any logical or consistent scheme. They are reflections of old tradition (ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λεγεται—*Phaedo* 63.c; παλαιὸς λόγος—*ibid.*, 70.c), brought in almost as improvisations to illustrate or reinforce the main argument. References in the dialogues to ancient tradition, or to sayings of wise men and women or

poets of old time, generally occur as introducing Pythagorean doctrines or veiled utterances of the Orphic hierophants. The Pythagorean doctrines of transmigration were commonly known. The Orphic books and mysteries proclaimed, as the destiny of the soul after death, judgement for its life in the body, the millennial cycles regulating its return to earth, and its ultimate escape from the wheel of incarnation. In the myths the pictures of the judgement seat, the meadow, and the cross-roads, are all features of the Orphic eschatology. On this traditional material Socrates could draw without committing himself to a positive acceptance of the beliefs involved. He uses it sometimes casually—almost humorously—as in *Phaedo*, 82, sometimes—as in *Republic*, 620—in an almost grotesque flight of fancy (*γελοίαν κὰι θαυμασίαν*)—where he describes the soul of Orpheus choosing reincarnation as a swan, Ajax as a lion, Agamemnon as an eagle, etc. These are warnings not to take the tale too seriously. Indeed, the whole scene of the after life world in the *Republic*, with its vague and grandiose astronomical setting and melodramatic action, is obviously intended as an elaborate allegory.

At the end of his demonstration of the immortality of the soul in *Republic* (611) Socrates asserts, as a necessary consequence of the doctrine of immortality, that the number of souls must be fixed and they must remain the same throughout. Such an assertion, if literally applied, would definitely banish to the realm of myth all theories of transmigration. It would also raise other difficulties which need not be discussed here. But in any case the idea of human souls being reincarnated in animal bodies would seem to run counter to the main Socratic doctrine of the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. That doctrine can be briefly stated as follows: There is, in the soul of man, a divine element the natural impulse of which is to attain, through the temporal flux of becoming in which it lives, knowledge or vision of the eternal Being to which it is akin. This impulse is in danger of being thwarted or overlaid by the arrogant claims of the bodily appetites, demanding immediate pleasure and satisfaction. Between these contending forces the life of the embodied soul is a scene of strife and trial. The soul which, following its divine element of reason, turns away from these sensual claims, frees itself in growing measure from the bonds and incrustations of the flesh, and on death escapes pure and uncontaminated from its mortal shell, to enjoy the friendships and amenities of its divine origin. Only a few, those who have lived the "philosophic" life, can achieve this complete deliverance. Many, as the mysteries announce, bear the wand of initiation, but few emerge with the seal of acceptance (*Phaedo*, 69.c). But it is the great prize, for which all must strive who are not wholly submerged in ephemeral interests, or

enslaved by the lusts and passions of the flesh—a hard contest but a noble prize. But this divine element of reason as a self-conscious being is the distinguishing mark of the soul of man. It is inconceivable, on this doctrine of the soul, that one which, by choice or default, has become incarnated in an animal body, should ever recover a human status and the consciousness of its more than mortal nature.

For the presentation of this doctrine, to minds which under bodily limitations can only see "as in a glass darkly," the tales in the myths of judgement, of millennial periods of purgation, and eventual reincarnation for better or worse, are merely the stage accessories, with meaning for those who understand. The meaning is that for man the chief end and duty is care of the soul, so that amid all the distractions and temptations of this temporal life it may keep a clear vision of the eternal world to which it belongs, and so, on the dissolution by death of the bodily frame, may pass free from earthly contacts, and fit for that enlarged existence which is rightly its own.

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF "PERPETUAL PEACE"

JOHN BOURKE, M.A., PH.D.

THERE are two main questions which it is possible to ask about war. The first is, whether it is inevitable; the second, whether it is desirable. The former question is one of fact, the latter one of value. In the discussions of ordinary conversation the two are frequently confused and obscured; arguments to prove war desirable may be heard based upon the supposed fact of its inevitability, and conversely. It is worth while considering how the two are related.

On the one hand, it appears that neither involves the other necessarily. For clearly we may hold an occurrence to be inevitable without also holding it to be desirable (e.g. my electrocution in the prime of life if I touch certain wires), and we speak of a thing as a "necessary evil"; and equally clearly we may deem something desirable without believing it to be inevitable. On the other hand, however, it does not seem that each cancels the other out. For it is not unreasonable to ask of something held to be inevitable whether it is also desirable, and of something thought desirable whether it be also inevitable. It does not seem that a determinist, or fatalist, is precluded altogether from using significantly the terms "desirable" and "undesirable," or from approving something as in some sense good or disapproving it as in some sense bad.[1] It is just as possible to hold[2] that war is inevitable and good, or that it is inevitable but bad, as it is to hold that it is good (or, again, that it is bad) but not inevitable.

But suppose, having decided that war is undesirable, we then go on to assert that it is morally *wrong* and ought to be prevented, and to cast about to devise schemes for its elimination, then the question of its inevitability confronts us acutely. For plainly, it is idle to try to prevent what has already been declared inevitable. To take steps to try to prevent a further outbreak of war is to admit that we do not believe war to be inevitable; and this, in turn, means that we do not believe that material conditions and events control and determine human "actions" in such a way that, when from time to time such conditions arise independently of our wills, there will supervene necessarily a state of affairs called war. Belief in the inevitability of war is compatible with belief in its

[1] The further question, by what right we pronounce *anything* inevitable, is not here relevant.

[2] With Heracleitus, Clausewitz, Treitschke, and others.

desirability. But belief in human freedom of action and human ability to prevent war are not compatible with belief in its inevitability. In this connection it matters little whether we are thinking of a single and final abolition of war, or of the progressive elimination of it. For if we believe war to be inevitable, we must hold that it is no more in our power to eliminate it gradually than it is to abolish it finally.

Kant was probably the most powerful and consistent exponent and champion of the doctrine of human freedom that has ever lived; and during the last twenty years of his life he became more and more interested in the prevention of war. In a little treatise entitled *Zum ewigen Frieden*,[1] published in 1795—the year in which the Peace of Basel had closed the first stage of the wars following the French Revolution—he has drawn up a scheme with this end in view. This little work is not the first place, nor the only one, where he has expressed views upon war and peace and their importance and value for the history of mankind. Scattered through some of his other works are remarks and passages on the subject; for instance, in the *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Standpoint* (*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*), in the *Critique of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*), in *On the Radical Evil in Human Nature* (*Vom radikalen Bösen in der Meschennatur*), and in the *Metaphysical Principles of Law* (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*)—published respectively in 1784, 1790, 1792, and 1797. But the treatise on "perpetual peace" contains the fullest, most independent, and most systematic presentation of his views; and it is upon this that we shall concentrate in considering them. The work is not, perhaps, widely known, and may acquire an increased interest at this time when once again Europe is rent with hatred and destruction, and once again voices are heard, more insistently perhaps than ever, urging the necessity of a new order

But there are two preliminary points with which it will be well to deal first. In the first place, Kant is no visionary or day-dreaming Utopian. His thought is eminently sober and practical. He makes no claim to offer a programme, cut-and-dried and complete, for the abolition of war at once, or in a lifetime, or in a century. He even makes it clear that the state of perpetual peace is an ideal which we probably cannot expect ever to see completely realized—he writes of "an approximation advancing *ad infinitum*."[2] He describes the inclination to war as one "which seems to be implanted in

[1] There is a good little English edition by Miss Mary Campbell Smith, (*Perpetual Peace*, Allen & Unwin, 1903, reprinted later) with a full and instructive Introduction, to which I am indebted, and a very readable translation which I have here used in the passages quoted.

[2] *Perpetual Peace*, Appendix II, last paragraph.

human nature."[1] Yet he holds that this approximation to permanent peace by the removal of the causes of war is an "immediate duty."[2] Therefore, a continual approach towards it is actually possible, and in an increasingly greater degree. War is thus not inevitable, even though, with human nature constituted as it is of a good element in perpetual conflict with an evil one, permanent peace may not in fact be possible of attainment.

The second point is the question whether Kant not merely urged the progressive elimination of war as a duty, but further held that no positive moral value at all attached to it. He did not think it inevitable; did he think it in any sense desirable? Some might fail to see how I hold it a duty to work for the elimination of something in which I saw the least elements of moral value. Yet there is no necessary contradiction here. All commend the doctors and medical investigators in their efforts to alleviate and eliminate illness; yet at the same time we recognize that illness may and does call out morally valuable qualities alike in those who suffer and in them that tend and watch. And it is possible to admit without hesitation—and Kant in the passage of the *Critique of Judgment* referred to above does so[3]—that the shock and crisis of war may awaken in the parties concerned qualities of courage and self-sacrifice that have great moral value. But to admit all this is not to hold either illness or war desirable in any sense in and for itself. The point at issue here is surely clear. To be justified in extolling war *on the ground* of the virtues awakened or stimulated in it, we must first be able to show that these virtues could be developed in no other way. But in general, for Kant, war is "the scourge of the human race" which "makes more bad men than it takes away."[4] Again, "reason, from her throne of the supreme law-giving moral power absolutely condemns war as a morally lawful proceeding, and makes a state of peace, on the other hand, an immediate duty."[5] And this, despite the elements of moral value accidentally awakened by war in its course. Kant makes the further important point that no question of *right* or *wrong* is ever decided in war; war is a mere trial of strength, and "victory" the favourable result for one side, proving doubtless who was stronger, but not who was right. It seems, then, that we must conclude that for Kant war is not only not necessary but also not in itself desirable.

[1] *Op. cit.*, First Section, Article 4.

[2] *Op. cit.*, Second Section, Article 2.

[3] *Critique of Judgment*, I, Bk. ii, 28.

[4] *On the Radical Evil in Human Nature*, III, note (see *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, ed. by T. K. Abbott, p. 341). Note that, while Kant says that war takes some bad men away and makes many more others bad, he does not suggest that any is morally improved thereby.

[5] *Perpetual Peace*, Second Section, Article 2.

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF "PERPETUAL PEACE"

In turning to Kant's teaching in this treatise we must bear in mind the principles fundamental to his whole ethic, for from the latter the former follows naturally. As is well known, Kant teaches that if our actions are to have moral value they must conform to, and be done for the sake of, a fundamental law or command. This law he formulates in two ways. The first is: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law."[1] And the second: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."[2] These two are but different facets of a single principle based on the conviction that "rational human nature exists as an end in itself."[3] Let us expand this a little. As humans we all share in a common, universal, rational human nature. Because of this we are free (as animals and things are not) to order and determine our actions and lives for good or evil. This freedom invests our human nature with a special dignity and an unique value. Human beings are not things, and are not to be treated or to treat each other as if they were. In my dealings with others I am to look on them as "ends in themselves," that is, possessors of a nature through which they can will good actions; and I am entitled to similar treatment myself, alike from myself and from others. This is what Kant is saying in the second version of his law. But now, this nature is universal; as humans we all possess it. Further, it is the only thing which we, *as humans*, do all possess in common. Consequently we find that, if we ask ourselves the question, How ought I to act? there is another way of expressing the answer: "I ought to act in such a way that the principle underlying any action I could will should become a universal law in the moral sphere." For what sorts of principles would they be that I could will should become universally binding as laws in this way? Clearly those which are grounded on something universally shared by all humans as such, and which touch them in respect of this universal possession—which is precisely their rational human nature with its unique freedom and peculiar dignity. The two versions supplement each other, the second stating the universal *ground* upon which the "universalizing" test contained in the first is based.

So much for our conduct one towards another as private moral individuals. But we are more than this, we are, whether we like it or not, members of a political community, and in the last resort subjects of a sovereign state, characterized by a certain constitution and confronting us at every turn of our lives with laws and regulations. We have seen Kant's view of private moral behaviour. How

[1] *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, 47.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 57. [3] *Loc. cit.*

is this related to our treatment by, and of, the state? How if the constitution of the state is such that under it we are not treated as ends in ourselves, e.g. are compelled to obey laws which we have not in any sense freely willed? Kant's answer to this is to be found in the treatise which we are considering, and may be said to form the link between the principles which he requires to govern private conduct on the one hand, and those which he requires should govern international relations on the other. He demands that "the civil constitution of each state shall be republican."[1] In such a constitution the essential elements for Kant are the recognition of the right of the citizen to elect representatives by voting, and the severance of the legislature from the executive.[2] The argument evidently is as follows. Permanent civil peace at home is no less important than, may indeed be said to be the precondition of, peace between nations. Now every human individual has, and furthermore is conscious of having, the freedom and right to determine his own actions and way of life; and permanent peace in a state will only be possible where the members are satisfied that the constitution recognizes and safeguards the reasonable exercise of this right. This, in turn, they will only be where the constitution is of the type termed by Kant "republican"; that is, one in which the citizens submit to the sovereign authority and obey the laws because, and only because, in the operations of these they recognize the expression of their own wills conveyed and rendered concrete through representatives whom they themselves have elected, and untouched by any powers which do not derive authority from them.[3] A constitution of this kind is, for Kant, the one and only concrete system within which it is possible for me to regulate my conduct in accordance with the moral law, not merely as a private person, but as a citizen within a state.[4]

We can now pass to the still more urgent and more difficult problem of the moral attitude of one state towards another. Kant here goes direct to the root of the matter. As far as individuals are concerned, he had sided with Hobbes, as against Rousseau, that men in the "state of nature" are hostile one to another—a view which for him no doubt followed from his doctrine of the evil principle innate in every man. He now applies this to the case of individual states considered as independent, which are, he holds in a state of nature one towards another: "nations, as states, may

[1] *Perpetual Peace*, Second Section, Article 1.

[2] *Loc. cit.*

[3] "That man is free who is conscious of himself as the author of the law which he obeys" (T. H. Green).

[4] Kant seems to use the term "republican" in a wider sense than is usual now. His two conditions of "republicanism" can be quite as consistently fulfilled under a limited monarchy as under an elected president.

be judged like individuals who, living in the natural state of society —that is to say, uncontrolled by external law—injure one another through their very proximity."[1] He realizes clearly that between independent sovereign states, so long as they remain independent and sovereign, no peace of any lasting kind can be expected.[2] The relations between individual states are here not analogous to those between individuals within a state. For, whereas individual citizens are restricted in respect of their independence and freedom within certain limits and by certain rules which they recognize and observe because they themselves have ultimately initiated them, individual states are not so restricted: "states, as such, are under no common external authority; and there is no instance of a state having ever been moved by argument to desist from its purpose."[3] There is no system of checks and balances regulating inter-state relations corresponding to that of constitutional and civil law which regulates relations between citizens of a state. In the last resort, however subtly the rulers of states may try to cloak their aims and intentions with an air of moral sanctity, they do in fact put into practice the advice of Machiavelli: "a prudent prince ought not to keep faith when by doing so it would be against his interest and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist."[4] Self-interest is, and cannot but be, the ultimate maxim for any state that is sovereign and independent; other considerations, if they arise, must take a second place.

The remedy for this proposed by Kant is that states must cease to be entirely independent, for otherwise "the method by which states prosecute their rights can never be by process of law—as it is where there is an external tribunal—but only by war."[5] There must be brought into existence a federation of states which can serve as the basis for an international law that shall be something more than a nebulous tissue of courtesies to be disregarded as interest dictates. This, after the demand for a republican civil constitution, is the second positive, definitive condition of permanent peace between nations: "the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states."[6] Again: "there can be no question of an international law, except on the assumption of some kind of a law-governed state of things, the external condition under which any right can belong to man. For the very idea of international law, as public right, implies the publication of a universal will determining the rights and properties of each individual nation; and this

[1] *Perpetual Peace*, Second Section, Article 2, opening words.

[2] See in this connection the suggestions made in Lionel Curtis's *Civitas Dei* (1937) and Clement Streit's *Union Now* (1939).

[3] *Perpetual Peace, loc. cit.*, later.

[4] *The Prince*, chap. xviii.

[5] *Perpetual Peace*, Second Section, Article 2.

[6] *Loc. cit.*

status juridicus must spring out of a contract of some sort, which may not, like the contract to which the state owes its origin, be founded upon compulsory laws, but may be, at the most, the agreement of a permanent free association such as the federation of the different states, to which we have alluded above."[1]

Before, however, this ideal federation of free republican states can be brought to pass, there are certain "preliminary conditions" which must, Kant holds, be first satisfied, and through which the attitude of human beings in different nations towards one another would undergo a gradual regeneration. Kant calls these the "preliminary conditions of perpetual peace between nations." They are six in number, and are as follows:

(1) No treaty of peace to be regarded as valid if made with the secret reservation of material for a future war.
(2) No independently existing state to be acquired by another through inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift.
(3) Standing armies to be gradually abolished as being a perpetual menace to peace.
(4) No national debts to be contracted in connection with external affairs.
(5) No state to interfere violently in the internal constitution of another.
(6) No belligerent state to employ modes of hostility which tend to jeopardize mutual confidence in the subsequent state of peace (these modes include espionage and inciting disaffection in the hostile state.)[2]

The burden of these conditions, if we take them all together, is clear. The only way of approximating gradually towards a state of permanent peace is by seeing to it that, each time a war is fought, the period following it shall be less and less a merely negative period, a mere cessation of hostilities, an interval between one war and another, and more and more a positive period in which constructive attempts are made to *establish* peace on a firmer and more lasting basis. Let, therefore, such wars as from time to time unhappily will still occur be conducted honourably and not in such a way as will further wreck confidence and respect; let the peace treaty which concludes each be, not vindictive merely, but open, generous, and constructive; and above all let each succeeding period of peace be one of serious and unceasing effort on all sides towards lessening the causes of further outbreaks. Kant is most insistent, and surely he is most right in this, that peace is not a mere absence of war. It is something which has to be prepared for and *established*[3] with

[1] *Perpetual Peace*, Appendix II, 2. [2] *Op. cit.*, First Section.
[3] *Gestiftet.*

effort, no mere passive state of relief hovering uneasily between a past on which we look back with horror and a future which we view with dazed indifference, but a time of hard and watchful effort, forward-looking, and pregnant with better things for the ages to come.

It remains now to inquire what kind of a federation it is which Kant here envisages. How does he think it will come about? What will be the nature of the supreme federal authority and of the laws which will regulate the interrelations of the members of the federative union? This, too, is of some topical interest, for we are hearing to-day of a movement to establish a "federal union" between nations.

If we feel disappointed—and there are some grounds for disappointment—that Kant has not elaborated these points in greater detail, we must not forget how much in advance of his time he was in entertaining a scheme of this character at all. True, the seventeenth century had seen plans and suggestions for regulating the relations between nations and humanizing war, but war had never, not even by Grotius, been thought of as other than a necessary phenomenon. Again, already between the years 1713 and 1717 the Abbé de St. Pierre had published his elaborate and acute "Projet de traité pour rendre la paix perpetuelle entre les souverains chrétiens," which, as its title suggests, was a great step forward; but, as its title perhaps also hints, its value was largely diminished by its inseparable connection with the political conditions at the time obtaining in Europe. Kant's scheme is the first fully to break away from the political conditions of any given time and be based upon universal facts of human nature which do not pass away with the ages. But for two reasons we must not expect to find in it a programme fulfilling all detailed demands that could be made upon it. It is general in character, an outline, a framework, and does not aim at being more. And then, even Kant could not foresee and anticipate the developments and problems of later days.

He is quite clear as to the primary requirement for the start of such a union. There must be a nucleus, to which then other members will be attracted; and this nucleus should already possess the qualities which, it is desired, should at last permeate the whole. "The practicability or objective reality of this idea of federation which is to extend gradually over all states and so lead to perpetual peace can be shown. For, if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic—which by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace—this would serve as a centre of federal union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom among the states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations. Gradually, through different unions of this kind, the federation would extend further and further."[1] From this

[1] *Perpetual Peace*, Second Section, Article 2, par. 4.

passage we seem to gather a further point. The phrase "different unions" (mehrere Verbindungen) suggests that Kant thinks of a number of these focal centres, in different parts of the world and coloured by local tradition, round each of which other units would gather, and all of which would then gradually coalesce. Friction would presumably be precluded during the process by the fact that each and all accept the same principles at the outset. These unions would be based upon a mutual "covenant of peace (*foedus pacificum*) which would differ from a treaty of peace (*pactum pacis*) in this respect, that the latter merely puts an end to one war, while the former seeks to put an end to war for ever. This alliance would not aim at the gain of any power whatsoever of the state."[1]

Yet there are other important points connected with the structure and maintenance of the federation upon which Kant might perhaps have elaborated further without impairing the formal character and timeless applicability of his scheme as a whole. In particular, three such points may be put forward. First, we should have been glad to hear more of the manner in which the central federal authority is to be established and composed, and whether it is to operate directly upon the citizens of the several states or through the medium of their governments. He suggests that the federal authority is to be set up by some kind of a compact[2] which, however, would differ somewhat from that by which the origin of civil society can be described, for the parties to it are units which "have already within themselves a legal constitution."[3] Nor does he seem altogether clear whether the ideal union which he has in mind is accurately described as a "State of nations" (Völkerstaat) or as a "federation of nations" (Völkerbund). The former notion is rejected in one passage[4], yet entertained in another;[5] and the nature of the central authority will depend upon what form the union is to take. Then, secondly, in any federal union there must be some surrender of sovereignty on the part of each member state, and we might expect to have found some account in Kant's scheme of the form that this would take, of precisely what aspects of sovereignty or powers the separate states would agree to forgo to the central authority as a self-imposed limitation of their own independence. And thirdly, it seems doubtful if any such union, especially in its early stages, could be successfully maintained in existence without some sort of guarantee, in the form of a federal police or militia, of its continued

[1] *Perpetual Peace*, earlier.
[2] *Loc. cit.* Also Appendix II, Section 2.
[3] *Loc. cit.*
[4] *Loc. cit.*, par. 1.
[5] *Loc. cit.*, last paragraph. The notion is again discussed in the *Metaphysical Principles of Law* (Part II, 61).

peaceful coherence;[1] but upon this, again, Kant does not touch, so far as I can find, except in so far as he demands the gradual abolition of all standing armies.

There is also the further important—some would say now, decisively important—question of the regulation of financial and general economic matters between states in a federation. How, for instance, are supply and demand to be so adjusted that one state will no longer be tempted to attack another to supply an urgent want or ambition; or again, so that we shall not have such a state of affairs as occurs to-day wherein one country is in dire need of a commodity which is rotting away or actually being destroyed in another that cannot get rid of a surplus of it? Again, what of the problems of money and credit? Is there to be a federal coinage? Are debts to be allowed to accumulate? With regard to this latter point Kant, as we have seen, forbids national debts to "be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state." "This source of help," we read further, "is above suspicion where assistance is sought outside or within the state on behalf of the economic administration of the country. . . . But as a common weapon used by the powers against one another, a credit system under which debts go on indefinitely increasing and are yet always assured against immediate claims (because all the creditors do not put in their claims at once) is a dangerous money power. This ingenious invention of a commercial people in the present century is, in other words, a treasure for the carrying on of war which may exceed the treasures of all the other states taken together, and can only be exhausted by a threatening deficiency in the taxes—an event, however, which will long be kept off by the very briskness of commerce resulting from the reaction of this system on industry and trade."[2] That Kant does not deal in greater detail with the economic aspect of the problem of federation can, however, well be understood, for the economic urgency and paradoxes of modern times had not arisen in his day, nor, consequently, had there yet been awakened an interest in "economics" as the study of a distinct sphere of phenomena.

This is not the place in which to enlarge more generally upon the problems here opened up by this little treatise. Our aim has been merely to set out and consider his views on the possibility and desirability of a permanent state of peace and the conditions which must first be fulfilled if an advance is to be made towards establishing it.

[1] "The essential of such a system is a collective preponderance of strength of those who are loyal to it over those who may assail it" (Sir A. Salter in *Political Quarterly*, vol. vii, No. 4, p. 467, in an article on "Reform of the League").

[2] *Perpetual Peace*, First Section, Article 4.

SOME REMINISCENCES BY THE LATE J. H. MUIRHEAD

(The following article is the substance of a chapter of an autobiographical account by the late John Henry Muirhead, in which with characteristic modesty the author gives the "recollection of a Journeyman in Philosophy of some movements of life and thought in his time." Professor Muirhead was closely connected with the Institute of Philosophical Studies and its Journal from its inception, and it was thought that readers of PHILOSOPHY would appreciate this account of visitors, philosophical and other, to Birmingham in the early years of the present century. The volume *John Henry Muirhead* will be published shortly by Messrs. George Allen and Unwin, and will include a short biographical completion and memoir together with a bibliography of Muirhead's writings.)

WE are told by the etymologists that the word "university" has nothing to do with the universal extent of the studies pursued, but was the mediaeval word for a society of any kind. Yet the universities, if not places of general learning, were places of learning in general, and tended in early days to be more removed from centres of active life and wider interests. It was all the more important that they should have links with the outer world and channels of connection with what was there going on. In the Scottish Universities this purpose was served by the Lord Rector, an institution which every three years secured to the students the opportunity of inviting, and by and by, hearing addresses from leaders in politics, literature, discovery, science, or religion. The Oxford colleges had their Visitors who less publicly played somewhat the same part. While still in Glasgow I had heard Bright and Gladstone, both when as Rector they addressed the students and afterwards when they spoke to the citizens in the evening in the City Hall—Bright at his eloquentest in his descriptive vision of the long line of single-room dwellers that the slums concealed as passing before him, and his appeal on their behalf for the City's merciful care. In Balliol I met at the Master's house Lord Peel, who had been for so long Speaker in the House of Commons. When we gathered round him after breakfast, someone asked him about his experience of orators in the House of Commons: who, he thought, had been the greatest. He told us that beyond all comparison John Bright was the greatest he had ever heard. He added the interesting incident that Bright himself had once asked him the somewhat embarrassing question what he thought was the source of his own power as a speaker, and after he had given one or two complimentary reasons for it Bright had replied: "No, no. It is because I speak so slowly." This certainly was a remarkable feature of his delivery. But the proper reply would have

been, "No, no, it is because John Bright speaks so slowly, and because of the Biblical simplicity of the words that he uses."

Long before the entrance of Chamberlain into politics and the foundation of the University, Birmingham had an arrangement, chiefly in the monthly Monday Lectures of the Midland Institute, to secure visits from distinguished men from London and elsewhere to keep it in touch with the larger life of the country in art, science, and politics. It was on one of these or on a similar occasion that I heard Lord Rosebery for the first and only time. He was addressing the students of the Institute, and though not so discouraging as when on a like occasion he is said to have exclaimed: "Good God, I sometimes think when addressing so many young people what is to become of you all!" he yet gave you the impression of a man who with all his wit and brilliant oratory found it difficult to take anything but the gloomiest view of the universe. Speaking of subjects of study and their effect upon the mind, he begged his audience to avoid astronomy because of the oppressive effect it had on the imagination. Not being a philosopher he probably had never heard of Kant's comparison of the majesty of the starry heavens without to that of the moral law within, and had forgotten Wordsworth's apostrophe to Duty as the principle which kept the stars in their courses.

Fortunately the advent of the University made no difference in this custom. The frequent presence of its Principal and professors was only an additional stimulus to these lecturers to give their best. It was here that for the first time I heard Roger Fry and Bernard Shaw give full-dress lectures, both of them, as it happened, on subjects with which in the later years of their lives they became specially identified. Fry's was on Perceptual Art illustrated from the early cave-drawings. To others probably besides myself, who were still deeply imbued with nineteenth century "intellectualism," it was the first introduction to what could be achieved by man in the age of innocence, before his "first disobedience" had impaired his vision—what perhaps might be recovered in a later age by re-absorption in the momentary, unconceptualized impression of what Nature could be in itself for us. How difficult it was for art to win its way back to this innocence we had yet to learn in large part through Fry's own later enthusiasm for the post-impressionists, still retained in spite of their manifold sophistications. Whether this intensity of vision and power of delineation has in reality any purely aesthetic quality at all, and is not rather the outcome of some dominating practical interest as of the huntsman or the shepherd, or again of totemistic religion, is another question. I believe that Fry was right, and that all the evidence is in favour of the recognition of the primitiveness of art, and against the view of it

as a refined and specialized form of activity that we had seen carried to such lengths in the aesthetic movement of the 'eighties and 'nineties. R. G. Collingwood is surely right when he tells us that "modern anthropology seeks for a religious motive in the art of palaeolithic man precisely as eighteenth-century philosophers sought for a political motive in the religious organization of primitive peoples."[1]

I was later, thanks to my friendship with his sister Margery, to meet Fry in his home in Dalston surrounded by his favourite pictures—one of the best ways of knowing an artist—and once again shortly before his lamentable death, when he took the chair at an evening lecture before the British Institute of Philosophy given by his friend Samuel Alexander and devoted to the exposition of his theory of the existence of a distinction in plastic art parallel to that between prose and poetry in literature. Many in the audience besides myself must have been struck by the contrast between the two men in race and education—the one the product of the best that Oxford, the other of the best that Cambridge had to give, the one steeped in his universalist philosophy of Space, Time, and Deity, the other in the individual forms of beauty spread about us in the small spaces that alone are at our command, yet united by that peculiar sensitiveness to the underlying unity of things, of which art as Shelley said is the "unveiling."

Bernard Shaw's Midland Institute lecture was given just at the time of a crisis in his remarkable intellectual career. I had seen and heard him in London in what might be called his Wagner and Nietsche and again in his Ibsen period. At the time of which I am speaking he had come under the more speculative side of the teaching of Samuel Butler and his anti-Darwinian doctrine of the underlying Will that guides the destinies of the world, and embodies itself in more or less conscious form in human habits and institutions. In his lecture, after some three-quarters of an hour of excellent Shavian banter he settled down to a fine statement of what this doctrine might mean as an antidote to the mechanical philosophy of the time. My wife and I had been invited by Lodge to have supper with him after the lecture, and in leaving the Hall I happened to say to him how much I had liked what he had been saying for the last quarter of an hour. He seemed pleased, and replied that he had in fact been trying to say in it "what he simply and profoundly believed." At the supper table he amused us with a description of his visit to Rodin's studio near Paris—a regular museum of art—where the sculptor was at the time engaged upon the well-known bust of the dramatist. Someone asked him how he got on in conversation with his host. He answered by quoting Rodin's answer to a

[1] *Outlines of a Philosophy of Art*, p. 15.

similar question, "It was not so much that Shaw spoke French, but that he spoke with such energy one could not help understanding him." After supper some of the members both of the senior and the junior staff of the University had been invited to meet him at coffee. Instead of devoting his attention to the more distinguished of the former, he gathered the juniors round him in the middle of the room and gave them the time of their lives. I always remind myself of that glimpse of him when I hear of the less humane sayings and actions sometimes not without justice attributed to him. Intermediate between these two Shaws was the one a friend once met when calling on a lady in London. As they came away together my friend made some polite remark about their hostess. "No, ma'am," said Shaw, "a thoroughly corrupt woman of the middle class."

The foundation of the University with its own Societies and endowed Lectureships and the contacts it brought with the national English and the Classical Associations provided new opportunities of bringing distinguished academic visitors to Birmingham. As President of the Classical Association, Henry Asquith, then Prime Minister and in the middle of the most violent stage of the military movement for Women's Suffrage, delivered an address in the City Hall. Immediately after he sat down the floor was taken by a suffragette who reasonably enough demanded after they had listened so quietly to him upon his own subject he should say something about theirs. Being at once gently led out into the corridor by the stewards, but having carefully planned her campaign, she took her way up to the platform and from just behind the chair made the same request. When this position became equally untenable and she was safely conducted out of the Hall, the business was resumed with a somewhat lengthy address by a distinguished Cambridge scholar, and closed without further incident. Some of us met Asquith familiarly afterwards at the house of the President of the Birmingham Liberal Association, with whom he was staying, when so far from speaking with resentment of his interrupter and her cause he expressed regret that she had not been allowed to have her say: "At any rate she would have been more interesting than that old bore ——!"

At a dinner shortly afterwards at which Winston Churchill was in the chair and I happened to be present a similar incident occurred. After the chairman had delivered his speech, a lady in beautiful evening dress sauntered into the Hall and, taking her seat just opposite him among the reporters, entered into conversation with him for some five minutes on votes for women before her object was discovered. As she was being led out behind me I heard her say that she had accomplished her object, and had enjoyed her talk with our guest. It was a national misfortune that these peaceful

and humorous methods were abandoned for open violence. What at the time struck those of us who were whole-hearted supporters of "the cause" was the irony of a situation in which the spirit of legality which it had taken so many centuries to build up was being shaken to its foundations by the sex which had reaped and had deserved to reap the greatest benefit from it. We did not then know how much the bitterness engendered by this development contributed to the German idea of the nation's unpreparedness for war.

To the English Association we owed several visits both before and after the war from Gilbert Murray. I believe it was at one of the former that he first read his translation of Euripides's *Trojan Women*. It was the only occasion on which I ever saw members of a public audience openly weeping. Later and just after the first meeting of the League of Nations he spoke to the Students' Union of the deep impression it had made upon him to see representatives of some fifty nations assembled together in the same hall as never in the history of the world before, in the spirit of friendship to discuss the organisation of peace. There were some philosophers who, mindful of Hegel's criticism of Kant's advocacy of such a League in *Zum Ewigen Frieden* on the ground of the danger of its bringing other counter leagues into existence, received the new gospel "with fear and trembling." But most of us at the time were caught up by enthusiasm for world peace, and even still (1937) with this great scholar and missionary of the League hope against hope for the ultimate success in this form or another of the one constructive idea that has emerged from the insensate folly of the last war.

Others brought by one society or another to the University were W. P. Ker, Lowes Dickinson, Bernard Bosanquet. It was on one of these occasions that Bosanquet took as the title of his lecture Ladies and Gentlemen. There had been a recent discussion in the *Daily Chronicle* of the definition of a gentleman which had gone off into what Carlyle called "gigmanery," or as Bosanquet put it, "considerations about the ratio between the cubic content of the front hall in a man's house and his gentlemanly qualities." One of the most frequently quoted sayings of T. H. Green was the aspiration with which he ended his report on the condition of Secondary Schools that the time should come when what was called the education of a gentleman should be open to every child in the country. The lecture was an attempt to show that round the centre of thought and conduct that constitutes a man's or a woman's "sterling worth," there is often an uncultivated margin that tends to obstruct the power of meeting the various situations of life, from railway travelling to politics and religion, in a way that gives expression to his or her real intelligence and good will. He gave the instance of the short-sighted lecturer who, observing a commotion in his audience and

afterwards having expressed a fear that he had failed to interest it, on being told that it was because Miss X. had fainted and had had to be taken out, observed, "Oh, that's all right then." The example was not likely to miss fire with his academic hearers.[1]

The foundation of the Workers' Educational Association and the establishment of a district branch in Birmingham and the Midlands shortly after the College became a University with the subsequent extension of the movement by the creation of the Institute of Adult Education, brought new contacts with the outside world. It was in connection, I think, with the latter that R. B. Haldane (afterwards Lord Haldane) came to deliver a lecture in the Central Hall, and I had the opportunity of renewing an old acquaintance dating from the 'eighties with this extraordinary man. Then I had known him as an eager and distinguished student of philosophy who in the middle of his University course in Edinburgh, by the advice of Professor Blackie and in deference to his parents' fear of Anglican influences if he should go to Oxford, had gone to Germany and had had his mind directed to idealist philosophy by Hermann Lotze at Göttingen. On his return he devoted himself to the study of Hegel and the theological writers inspired by him, nearer home to the teaching of Hutchison Stirling and Green. He was one of the group of rising writers who published *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* in 1883, but he had already by that time gone to London, and, without losing his interest in philosophy, entered on his career as a barrister. This was combined in 1885 with that of a member of Parliament for East Lothian, adding thus a third to the make-up of the complete Haldane. The fourth and greatest of them all was still in the distance and wholly unforeseen by any of us. Even the third just mentioned—that of the Parliamentarian—seemed handicapped by the habits of thinking and speaking inured in him by his philosophical and legal training. Members found him difficult to follow owing as Bryce ingeniously suggested to the fact that his speeches "had no paragraphs," and to what another described as "his penguin-like gestures" and the impression he gave of a conjuror hypnotizing his audience while he performed his tricks of legerdemain. For a political leader, moreover, he lacked the indispensable quality of vivid imagination and the passion that could carry his imaginings home to his audience. That in spite of these defects he rose to occupy what turned out to be the key position in the Government in the crucial years from 1905 to 1914,

[1] He happened to be staying with us over night, and when, returning home latish in the evening after the lecture, I found that I had forgotten my latch-key, he had an opportunity of practising what he had been preaching. He was a good shot, and taking up a handful of gravel from the path he threw it at the top room window where the maids were asleep with just sufficient force to break their slumbers without breaking the glass.

and to become what General Haig, in the dedication of the volume of his dispatches, left at his door after riding with the King at the head of his victorious troops through London, described as "the greatest Secretary of War England has ever had"—was the miracle of his career.

At the date of which I am speaking we all knew that he was destined for high office, and in view of his interest in higher education and his services to it we naturally thought of him as the future Minister of Education. Who better fitted than he to complete the structure that others had begun? "Our common faith," he wrote of himself and his friends at this time in words that T. H. Green might have used, "was our faith in the effect of higher education on democracy. We did not think that such education was everything. There were other phases of mental activity such as religion and the love of the beautiful which were not less important. But we thought that people whose minds were freed from the fetters of ignorance would develop these other phases more readily."[1]

We were correspondingly astonished when instead of the Education Office he became head of the War Office. Instead of asking, "Is Saul also among the prophets?" we were inclined to ask, "Is Haldane also among the Sauls?" He gives the explanation in his autobiography: "Over the reform of Education the Liberals were pretty bad. The truth was that despite the vast importance of the question too few people were keenly interested in education to afford us the requisite breeze for our sails."[2] Whether there was sufficient breeze to fill his sails for the reform of the Army he didn't know, but he had the courage to take the risk. When Campbell Bannerman in the formation of his Ministry told him that "Nobody would touch the War Office with a pole," he promptly replied: "Then give it to me."[3] It might seem a far cry from Hegelian philosophy to army administration. But it was from Hegel he had learned that the only way to see and deal with a problem was to see it and deal with it as a whole, and nowhere did it seem more necessary to apply this maxim than at the War Office of those days. It was no mere light-hearted jest when, on the Army Council asking him for some notion of the Army he had in mind, his answer was, "A Hegelian Army." Nor was it any wonder that thereupon the "conversation fell off."[4] As a matter of fact, it was not merely the teaching of German philosophy in general that he brought to his task, but the application of it to the philosophy of War as he found

[1] *Autobiography*, p. 295.

[2] Pp. 218 foll. It was in the end this inertia of the Liberals in the matter of educational reform as contrasted with the deep concern for it in the Labour Party that later led him to throw in his fortunes with it.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

it in Clausewitz and the other great German authorities. He was wise enough to know *fas est ab hoste doceri*. Strange that the German philosophy which stained his reputation with the rabble both inside and outside Parliament at the beginning of the war was at that very moment saving the situation at Mons!

I have sometimes been asked by politicians what was thought of this or that member of the House who had the reputation of being a philosopher.[1] In the case of Haldane the question was not difficult to answer. I once said in my haste to Bosanquet, possibly after the lecture Haldane gave to the Ethical Society in its early days at Toynbee Hall, that he seemed to me to be "living on his capital." It would not have been surprising if this had been true in the case of a man who was living at that time the threefold life I have already mentioned and who said of himself that "his interests were too varied for concentration." As a matter of fact he was an omnivorous reader. Few of the new books in philosophy, none of the important ones in it, escaped him. He could put, moreover, into his days (in which as he tells us he took no recreation except dining out) three times the work that any other man could. What is I think true of him was that, once having mastered the principles of Hegel's philosophy in a way that few of the younger men had done, he devoted himself to the consistent application of what he conceived to be true in them to the main problems of life with which he was called on to deal. From his own multifarious experience he was thus able when he returned to philosophy, as he was constantly doing in lectures and books, to illustrate his text from departments of activity for the most part unfamiliar to his audience or his readers. It was this sense of the reality of ideas as things "with hands and feet" (as Hegel said) which could move—in the end which alone could permanently move mankind, that made all he wrote himself or quoted (as so frequently he did from Hegel and Goethe) so well worth reading. I do not know any philosopher belonging to what I have elsewhere called the second generation of British idealists who used with greater effect what he found in the teaching of these two great men. That he turned away from the advance that Bradley and Bosanquet were seeking to make on Hegel on the ground of the sceptical note that he seemed to find in them was characteristic of one who believed that "philosophy gave back to his generation what science threatened to take away, namely, faith in the reality of the spiritual world,"[2] and who thought that he had found in Hegel something on which he was ready to stake everything and

[1] Professor Bryce once asked me this question about Balfour, and seemed somewhat surprised when I replied that his reputation among philosophers partly rested on his great place in the House of Commons. "Odd!" he said, "we give him great credit there for his position among philosophers!"

[2] Elizabeth Haldane in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

which he was unwilling to surrender. He has been accused of "intellectualism." If this means belief in the power of ideas to mould men's lives and in the power of great and true ideas to mould them in the right directions, the accusation was true. But in these days when flagrantly false ideas are being given wings by all the arts of nationalist or class propaganda, who can tell us of any other way of meeting the danger threatened by them than by the advocacy in season and out of season of those truer ones on which all civilisation worthy of the name rests? If there was one public man on whom one could always rely for such advocacy it was Haldane.

Between the Birmingham meeting I have spoken of and within a few months of his death I had few if any opportunities of meeting him. But when already the shadow was upon him, he took the chair at a private dinner in the Bath Club given in honour of Professor John Dewey, returning as it were to the haunts of his youth in academic circles after his long wanderings. He spoke in a low voice, but perhaps all the more impressively for that on the work of the philosopher. After the dinner he sat with his eyes closed in the middle of the room while we talked to one another. It was only at his own request that I brought my wife to be introduced to him. Taking him all in all and by reason of what I have said of him, he was not only the most remarkable man of the philosophical group to which I belonged, but one of the most remarkable men in the history of my time. In the interval already mentioned I became acquainted with his brother Dr. J. S. Haldane as a colleague in Birmingham University, who to his own line of investigation brought the same constructive ideas as R. B. brought to politics, and through the application of them to problems of biology, and thereafter to problems of life in general, gained a reputation hardly less outstanding or likely to be less enduring than that of his brother.

The Huxley Lectureship enabled the University to attract lecturers from foreign countries, and Lodge's genuine interest in philosophy led to the invitation of the French philosophers Emile Boutroux and Henri Bergson to deliver it shortly after its foundation. Boutroux was already an old man, having been born in 1845, but he still held himself straight, his hair was still black, and he was full of vigour and enthusiasm for the doctrine expounded in his book *De la contingence des lois de la nature* which had first appeared in 1874, and was by this time in its fourth edition. In this country the reaction against the idea, current in the nineteenth-century philosophy, of nature as a rigid system controlled to its roots by mechanical law, and reflecting the same sort of necessary connection as subsists between mathematical equations, was so long in obtaining effective expression that one is apt to forget how much earlier it began across the channel. Already in the 'fifties a "new critical

philosophy," founded on Kant's old one, but going beyond Kant in the refusal to regard the law of mechanical causation as all-sufficient for the interpretation of nature was on its way in France. But the earlier writers were still too much occupied with psychology and the theory of knowledge to realise the full importance of their teaching for physics and metaphysics. Boutroux was one of the first to attack from a philosophical point of view the idea that the cosmos can be explained without remainder by the law of "geometric causality." If it consists as manifestly it does of a hierarchy of forms passing from lifeless to living matter and from living matter to conscious souls, there must from the beginning have been even in the lowest forms of nature an element of spontaneity and creativity inexplicable in terms of mechanical forces. Unless the word *contingence* has a meaning in French that differentiates it from our "contingency," Boutroux's choice of it was unfortunate, suggesting, as it did, something haphazard which is the precise opposite of what was meant, viz. an inner direction given to things by reason of their participation in the creative onrush of life. But the idea which Boutroux expounded of the inadequacy of geometric necessity to do justice to the inner complexity and creative trend in things and of its subordination in ever higher degree to purposeful direction marked the beginning of a revolution in the philosophy of nature that is the most striking feature of these latter days. I do not think that at the time of which I am speaking we had any clear idea of what his teaching portended. He committed, moreover, the mistake on his visit to us of presupposing, with French politeness, the existence of the same kind of interest in his subject in a Birmingham audience as he would have found in a Parisian one, and far exceeded the conventional hour in the delivery of his lecture. For either or both of these reasons the impression he made was somewhat disappointing.

It was entirely different when in 1911 Bergson gave the Huxley Lecture. By this time he was known as the foremost thinker not only in France but in Europe. His philosophical virtue was no cloistered one. In spite of the strain of mysticism in him he had a profound interest in practice which has continued to show itself more and more in his later books culminating in the last on the *Two Sources of Morality and Religion.* The message he sent from a sick-bed to the International Congress of Philosophy held at Paris in the present year (1937) that "we should act as men of thought and think as men of action" may be said to have been the message of his own life and his brilliant literary style enabled him to spread it over the reading world. At the time of which I am speaking this trend was not so obvious. He had been a pupil of Boutroux and spoke of him on his visit to us with the greatest respect; but he

went far beyond his master in the search for a deeper psychological basis for his doctrine of freedom and for a new view of the vital creative force that underlies the processes of creation, that allied his philosophy more to the neo-Platonists than the Kantians.[1] His book *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* had been published in English under the title of *Time and Free-Will* from the seventh French edition in the Library of Philosophy the previous year; and translations of *Matière et Mémoire* and *L'Evolution creatrice* from sixth editions were already on their way.

Nothing *prima facie* could seem to be more opposed to the circle of ideas in which I had myself been trained than that contained in these books. True, both were idealistic in the broad sense of standing for the ultimate reality of free spirit. But the starting-points of the two systems were poles asunder. To the older one the reality of things was to be sought for in what was revealed to thought ("the real is the rational"), to the other it was to be sought for in what is immediately given to intuition. Of the one the hall-mark might almost be said to be the unreality of time; by the other time in the sense of *durée* was made the head of the corner. No wonder that Bergsonism seemed to come as a challenge to the older idealism, or that the suspicion of it was deepened when it received the enthusiastic approval of William James, the arch-enemy of all non-temporal Absolutes.[2] "What could be said," we were inclined to ask, "for a philosophy that not only began with unmediated intuition but rejected processes of thought and the conceptions with which they operated as a turning of the mind inside out and a falsification of the truth of things accepted in the interest of language and social practice but otherwise opaque to our vision?" It was naturally this apparent paradox that was made the object of attack in our criticisms of Bergsonism as involving a rejection of the fundamental place claimed by the Kantians both old and new for conception and judgment in the interpretation of what is given in experience. "If *thinking*," we asked again, "were a darkening of council, whence was light to come? If water choked what was there left to drink?" We were willing to admit that Hegel's tirades against intuition and the posturing of genius were exaggerated, and that a place must be found for immediate insight and conviction. But this was one thing, to claim that it was everything and that all conceptual thinking only led away from the truth of things was quite another.

[1] When I happened to mention this strain in it as having much impressed me, he told me that the first course of lectures he had given was on Plotinus. It was from Plotinus, too, that he took the motto of his first important book: "If anyone were to ask Nature for her aim in creation, and if she were willing to lend an ear and to speak, she would say: 'Ask not but understand in silence even as I am silent and unused to speech.' "

[2] *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909), Lecture VI.

In my own case wider acquaintance with what Bergson had written, especially in his article in the *Revue de Metaphysic et de Morale* of January 1903, on "Introduction a la metaphysique," and in conversation with him convinced me that what he seemed to be taking away with one hand he was giving back with the other, seeing that he compared conceptual thinking to pencil notes on a subject—altogether necessary as a preliminary to writing upon it, but requiring to be put together under the inspiration of an intuited whole. What was this but the old Kantian distinction between understanding and reason, with the same distrust of the categories of the former as guides to the truth of things and merely suffering from an overemphasis on their exclusively practical validity? Whether at this level we speak of "reason" or of "intuition" is indifferent, so long as we understand that the intuition is not merely a passive reception of impressions but involves an active synthesis of what is received.

When all was said, moreover, about Bergson's central doctrine of the unity of past, present, and future in *durée* (expressed in his Birmingham lecture in the phrase that in all experience "we *recline* upon the past, we *incline* to the future") was not this only a translation into light and luminous French of Kant's ponderous and obscure "unity of apperception?" There remained doubtless the war to the death against the Hegelian doctrine of the Absolute as an attempt to round up the Heraclitean flux of things into the stagnant pool which James called a "block universe." But I believed then as I believe still that, though this interpretation might be valid of the Sphere of Parmenides or the geometrical Substance of Spinoza, it was inapplicable to a view which refused to submerge in an all-devouring abyss any authentic element in experience, such as the time-flow essentially is, however inadequate it may be to express the meaningfulness of the events which it draws out in the form of historical succession.

While in Birmingham, Bergson stayed with the Lodges. On the day of his lecture he came to lunch under the apple-tree in my small garden to meet S. Alexander, who was staying with me at the time. His closely shaven face and spare figure, suggestive of the extremely simple, almost ascetic, life he led, were instinct with an eager vitality. Someone afterwards remarked on his resemblance to John Stuart Mill; and he might almost have sat for the statue of Mill on the Embankment. The part of the conversation on this occasion which has remained in my memory was his criticism of the spiritualists' argument for survival (doubtless suggested by Lodge's preoccupation with it at the time). It was as characteristic as it still seems to me to be decisive. Only one thing would convince him that through the Medium we are in touch with departed souls, namely, that some

novel creative idea should come to us from the Great Beyond, the dwelling place of Creative Spirit.

The lecture was a great success. Being practically bilingual he gave it in English almost as delicate as his French. It was on the line of what he had already said in the third chapter of *Creative Evolution* on personality as the goal of the *élan vital*—the goal towards which it had been tunnelling its way through the darkness into the light of day—albeit only as yet taking as it were its first breath in the upper air.

William James did not come to deliver a lecture but for rest and refreshment in the discussion of psychical matters with Lodge and to recover from the depressing effects of lecturing in Oxford, which he described amusingly as contrasting with what he was accustomed to at home. There, when you had given a lecture, good, bad, or indifferent, your friends crowd round you on the platform eager to shake your hand and congratulate you as having done the best thing in your life. When you can get away from them, you leave the hall feeling that you *have* done one of the best things in your life. In England instantly the lecture is over you see nothing but backs, and in a few minutes you are left alone in a state of the deepest dejection till your chairman and host languidly suggested that the car was waiting, and you had better come and have some tea. We made up our minds that, lecture or no lecture, we would let no false modesty interfere with our respect for himself and his country, and would do all we could to make him feel at home. His own manners were entirely simple and unacademic. One could believe the stories of his informal method of conducting his classes in Harvard, as when, in illustrating the effect on mentality of bodily posture, he would lay himself down full length on the floor; or when on another occasion, after a pause in a witty and only half-serious criticism, a student cut in with, "But, Professor, to be serious for a moment." He came with Lodge to dinner to meet a friend of my wife's, Miss Mabel Woodward, a highly endowed Kindergarten teacher with a voice and style of singing all her own, whose biography after her early death Lodge wrote for private circulation. James himself was in great form, among other good stories telling us one of his brother Henry when calling on a cousin in London. As he was leaving he happened to slip on the parquet floor of her sitting-room, and to express himself in adequate language, for which he humbly begged his hostess's pardon, to receive the answer, "Oh, yes, Henry, by all means. It is the first intelligible word I have heard from you."

Though I saw Mrs. James again in their own house at Cambridge on my first visit to America in 1921, William James had already gone by that time, and I never saw him again.

It is difficult to tell, perhaps it is too soon to try, what my own

generation owed to William James. Our estimate will probably depend on whether we are thinking of his *Principles of Psychology*, with which he first established his fame, or of his later more sporadic work as the founder of the pragmatist philosophy. On the place he won for himself by his great book there can be no doubt whatever. At a time when psychology was on the one hand falling into the grooves of a textbook subject on the basis of introspection, on the other was straining to become an experimental science in fast multiplying psychological laboratories, his book gave it a place it had never had before as a humane study upon which practicians in every field, whether of education, politics, ethics, or religion might draw. Just before he came to Birmingham the members of the University staff, in view of the plans for the new buildings that were under consideration, had been asked to state what accommodation for the effective conduct of their departments they would require. I was in a state of hesitation as to whether I should put in a claim for a psychological laboratory, and consulted James about it. Rather to my surprise he spoke of the disappointment he felt in the results of laboratory work as apt to be merely a vain repetition of familiar experiments and a heaping up of useless statistics.[1] On the other hand, no subject offered itself more obviously as an essential element in a liberal education, or more directly as a means of self-knowledge in the Socratic sense. The chapters on the *Principles* on Habit, Will, and Emotion are classical examples of what could be made of it, while his little book, *Talks to Teachers*, seemed to me to be worth all the rest of the educational textbooks of my time.[2] The question of the place of Pragmatism in the philosophy of my time is a more difficult question. Of one thing there can be no doubt, whatever—the power of its impact on my generation. More than any other it may be said to have broken into all the old lines of division among philosophies. It was to be empiricism in the sense that everything that claimed to be true must be brought to the test of actual fact —what James called its "cash value." On the other hand, it differed from the empiricism of Hume and joined hands with Kant's transcendentalism in recognizing the continuity of the data of sense, and the impossibility of interpreting experience as a mere succession of sensations (relations are given as decisively as sensory content); and, further, in recognizing with Kant the active part that the mind plays in the formation and verification of objects presented to knowledge. If this seemed to ally him with idealism it was only

[1] I found this view afterwards stated more definitely in a letter of 1896. "The results that come from all this laboratory work seem to me to become more and more disappointing and trivial. What is most needed is new ideas. For every man who has one of them one may find a hundred who are willing to drudge patiently at some unimportant experiment."

[2] With the exception, I should add, of John MacCunn's *Making of Character*.

under conditions, chiefly that it must disown all connection with the Absolutism with which it had been infected by Kant's followers in its attempt to escape his agnosticism. If we were in the end to be faced with what, borrowing the phrase from Thomas Davidson, he called a "block universe," what room was there for human will to change it? If all perfection were already there in the Absolute, what need for man to repeat it in such lamentably inadequate forms. It was only if the universe is a somewhat loose-strung business and open to adventure that there is any scope for man's efforts to improve it; only if it is believed that the good is not already all there, and that whatever gods there be need our help in winning the victory for it, can there be any inspiration in putting our wills into our work here. It was this doctrine that was the text of the book which more than any other is identified with James's name, *The Will to Believe*, published in 1897. The name, as he came afterwards to think, was an unlucky one (it ought to have been "The Right to Believe"), and more than anything else gave currency to the idea that Pragmatism meant "believe what suits your practical needs," so easily converted into "believe what you wish." This in fact was as far as possible from James's real meaning. What he sought was to make clear the place of faith in a world which science and an ultra-intellectualist philosophy seemed bent on making proof against its invasion. In the field of practical life there are occasions when there is no room for deliberation, and when he who hesitates is lost; even where there is room there are some situations in which our own action is what will cast the die, and others still in which owing to our ignorance we have to take our courage in our two hands and make a plunge, "hoping for the best."

It was this doctrine that turned pragmatism from the expression of a mood into a philosophy of the nature of things. "The inevitable stales," he quoted in the preface to *The Will To Believe*, "while doubt and hope are sisters. Not unfortunately the universe is wild-game-flavoured as a hawk's wing." "There is no possible point of view," he himself continues, "from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact." This is what he called at one time pluralism, at another radical empiricism. It was at once the source of the strength and (to many of us) the weakness of pragmatism. It was the source of strength, if it could be taken to mean that the idea of the world as a closed system of causally determined fact from which the physicist, or again the idea of it as a system of intellectually intelligible truths, from which the rationalist starts, is no more than an assumption that we must make when we regard the world from the point of view of one particular abstract aspect of it, and has to be corrected in view of a wider experience—is in fact appearance and not reality. It was the source of weakness in so

far as it was interpreted to mean that these aspects were *mere* appearances and could be made to *dis*appear from the world of our experience by a wave of the pragmatist's wand. To say that these are not the ultimate and sole aspects of our world, of which we have to take account, is one thing, to say that we may play fast and loose with them in deference to further practical ends is quite another. Knowledge is indeed an instrument—the most powerful instrument in the world. But it is useful as an instrument because it is true, it is not true because it is useful as an instrument. Yet it was the latter suggestion that to a large extent explained the vogue it attained on a continent, where, as H. W. Massingham once wittily said, "the flash point of new ideas is exceptionally low." In England, separated from America by the wide and cool Atlantic, in spite of the brilliant, untiring advocacy of Pragmatism by F. C. S. Schiller, it took little or no hold. As a matter of fact, neither to James nor to Dewey is there any real ground for attributing anything so superficial. Both of them accepted with the rest of us a world of verifiable facts as "chiels that winna ding," both of them accepted the idea of a rational verifiable Good as the end to realize which is an unconditional law of life. "There is one unconditional commandment," wrote James, "which is that we should seek incessantly with fear and trembling so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see." What was of value and of real significance in the doctrine was that it expressed in its own way the thought that was moving in the whole philosophical movement of the time, namely, that the essence of things was to be looked for not in the merely given existing facts, but in the values of which they are the bearers, the ends to which they could be put in the furtherance of good. Lotze in the middle of the century had declared his belief that the essence of things was to be sought, not in what they "are" but in what they "ought to be," in a word that "the roots of metaphysics were in ethics." Taking ethics in the wide sense of the theory of what is intrinsically good, it was towards this essentially Platonic doctrine that, largely unrecognized by us at the time, all serious philosophy was moving. If we had seen the contentions of Pragmatism in this light we should have been saved much barren, not always good-natured, controversy about it.

Fortunately in the years of which I am speaking there were social and political controversies afoot which, while they separated parties in the State, tended to unite philosophers, as they had never been united before, in the search for the values which are abiding and devotion to which alone can give security and stability to human life upon our globe.

James's sympathy with psychical research which brought him

into touch with Lodge was of a piece with his interest in the underworld in science as well as in society. In early days (1888) he had been the discoverer of Mrs. Piper. But he came to be less and less impressed with the light that seances with her and other mediums brought. In 1895 he wrote, "If only we could get up here some variations upon Piper," and in 1897, "Hodgson's devotion to Mrs. Piper is a real monstrosity of patience." In a similar vein he wrote to Henry Sidgwick, "It has been a bad blow to my faith in expertness and the effects of education in these matters, to see Lodge and Myers so precipitate in publication, not to say conclusive." He rejoiced to have seen hypnotism, hysteria, possession, multiple personality in his day removed from the realm of superstition and charlatanry. Even in spite of his disappointment in the work of the S.P.R. he still believed that we have to reckon with a residuum of supranormal experience revealed by it: in a word, that there was "something in it."[1] Some of us are still in the same state and live in the hope that, before we ourselves make the great experiment, we may discover what the "something" is.

[1] Readers interested in the early history of Psychical Research in America could not do better than refer to Chap. LXI in R. B. Perry's monumental book on the *Thought and Character of William James*.

PRACTICAL REASON

REGINALD JACKSON, M.A., D. Litt.

"The will is nothing but practical reason." In other words choice, without being any kind of judgement, resembles inference in being either valid or invalid. Moral rightness is validity of choice.

I do not undertake here to interpret Kant.[1] I do not inquire what Kant means by saying that "the will is nothing but practical reason." I inquire rather what ought to be meant by saying this or even by distinguishing practical, from theoretical, reason. And in what ought to be meant I find an answer to the question what moral rightness is. But I do not find what Kant thinks he finds—an answer to the further question of the content of the moral law. Kant, I think, insufficiently recognizes that choice, if like inference it can be valid, can like inference also be invalid. He insufficiently distinguishes invalid choice from failure to choose. Accordingly, he insufficiently distinguishes *false* moral laws (false answers to the question "What is or are the principle or principles of valid choice?") from *spurious* moral laws (propositions that, whether true or false, are not answers to this question). He consequently mistakes the wounding of one bird for the killing of two. For, if moral law need only be genuine in order to be true, an answer to the question what moral rightness is may well be at the same time an answer to the question of the content of the moral law.

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."[2] Hume admits that "this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary"; and both before and since Hume defended it there have been many attempts to refute it. Yet nobody before Kant succeeded in laying bare the root of the error. And not even Kant succeeded in extracting the root.

Hume maintains "that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion."[3] If reason could influence conduct in no other ways than these, then reason really could not pretend to any other *practical* office than that of serving the passions. Many moralists, admit-

[1] This task I reserve for a further article on *Kant's Distinction between Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives.*

[2] Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature* (Selby-Bigge), p. 415.

[3] P. 459.

ting this, would meet the argument by the protest that reason discovers, and informs us of, much more than Hume allows. The protest would be true. But the protest would not affect the main issue.

"A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, or which produces the contrary to what is imagin'd. A person may also take false measures for the attaining his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct, instead of forwarding the execution of any project. These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions, which are connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in a figurative and improper way of speaking. But tho' this be acknowledg'd, 'tis easy to observe, that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality, that they are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them. They extend not beyond a mistake of *fact*, which moralists have not generally suppos'd criminal, as being perfectly involuntary. I am more to be lamented than blam'd, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character. A fruit, for instance, that is really disagreeable, appears to me at a distance, and thro' mistake I fancy it to be pleasant and delicious. Here is one error. I choose certain means of reaching this fruit, which are not proper for my end. Here is a second error; nor is there any third one, which can ever possibly enter into our reasonings concerning actions."[1]

There *is*, many moralists would protest, a third error which can "enter into our reasonings concerning actions," an error which, unlike those noticed by Hume, is a mistake not of *fact* but of *right*, an error which, accordingly, is not "perfectly involuntary" and does manifest "a defect in my moral character."

Hume anticipates this protest. But he does not elaborate his reply. "Shou'd it be pretended, that tho' a mistake of *fact* be not criminal, yet a mistake of *right* often is; and that this may be the source of immorality: I would answer, that 'tis impossible such a mistake can ever be the original source of immorality, since it supposes a real right and wrong; that is, a real distinction in morals, independent of these judgments. A mistake, therefore, of right may become a species of immorality; but 'tis only a secondary one, and is founded on some other, antecedent to it."[2]

The possibility here considered is that reason can inform us that a certain kind of conduct is wrong. The false judgement that such

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, pp. 459–60. [2] P. 460.

conduct would not be wrong would, accordingly, be unreasonable. Hume concedes that this unreasonable judgement might be "a species of immorality," but claims that the falsity of the judgement would be founded on the immorality of something else, namely the kind of conduct.

What we want to know is whether, granted that the false judgement that such conduct would not be wrong would be unreasonable, such conduct would itself be unreasonable.

Suppose that the agent falsely judges that the conduct would not be wrong. The supposition is relevant only if we suppose further that the agent's conduct is influenced by this false judgement. The false judgement is *ex hypothesi* unreasonable. But does its unreasonableness make the conduct unreasonable in any way other than Hume has acknowledged? Clearly not. The conduct is appropriate to the judgement. Wrong conduct perhaps is a "proper object" of aversion. And reason perhaps can inform us that a certain kind of conduct is wrong. But the agent's reason has not informed him. His conduct is unreasonable only in conforming to an unreasonable judgement.

Suppose that the agent truly judges that the conduct would be wrong, but that wrong conduct is not an object of his aversion. This time the judgement is reasonable and the conduct is inappropriate to the judgement. But is the conduct therefore unreasonable? If the conduct is unreasonable, it is so simply because it is inappropriate to the agent's judgement and not because the judgement to which it is inappropriate is a reasonable judgement. It is in the relation between conduct and judgement that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of conduct must be sought, not in the reasonableness or unreasonableness of judgement and not, therefore, in any *information* which reason can give.

Thus the protest that reason discovers, and informs us of, much more than Hume allows is seen, although true, to afford no remedy. I have said that, if reason could influence conduct in no other ways than Hume allows, then reason could discharge no other practical office than that of serving the passions. A more ambitious claim is warranted. If reason could influence conduct in no other way than by *discovery*, then reason could discharge no other practical office than that of serving the passions.

"Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood."[1] Hume says this without entertaining even the possibility of a challenge. And perhaps not many philosophers would think of challenging it. Yet the root of the error is to be found in this seemingly innocent statement. If reason is no more than discovery, then reason is no more than theoretical, and its practical office is restricted, as Kant puts it, to

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 458.

the administration of a foreign interest. Reason can be *practical*, as distinguished from being merely *applicable to practice*, only if reason can influence conduct otherwise than by discovery.

Before venturing in quest of so ambitious a remedy, let us assure ourselves that we really need a remedy. We have appreciated the strength of Hume's negative position. We must appreciate also the weakness of Hume's positive position. For Hume does not and may not content himself with the bare denial that reason can be irreducibly practical. He does and must fill the gap with a complementary affirmation. If reason cannot be irreducibly practical, what can? If "reason is wholly inactive,"[1] what, instead of reason, is active?

Passion. But, granted that reason can "serve and obey," does Hume succeed in showing that passion can command? Does Hume not, rather, unwittingly reveal that, whether or not reason can command, it is at least certain that nothing else can?

The point in dispute is the nature, not of impulsive, but of deliberate action. An account "of the influencing motives of the will"[2] might be expected even to exclude impulsive action. But we must be guided by Hume's definition: "I desire it may be observ'd, that by the *will*, I mean nothing but *the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.*"[3] Conformably to this definition an account "of the influencing motives of the will" would be an account rather of voluntary action in general than of deliberate action in particular. Granted, however, that Hume is at liberty to include impulsive action, he is certainly not at liberty to exclude deliberate action. "In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove *first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will."[4] And Hume is bound not only to include, but with special care to examine, deliberate action. For what he here calls "all this philosophy" is what he has just called "the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern."[5] And what he calls "the fallacy of all this philosophy" must be the view that activity of reason is just what distinguishes deliberate, from impulsive, action.

Does Hume, then, succeed in showing that passion, however liberally served by discoveries of reason, suffices for *deliberate* action? Does Hume offer a tenable account of *choice*?

"'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 458. [2] Bk. II, Pt. III, Sect. III.
[3] P. 399. [4] P. 413. [5] P. 413.

uneasiness or satisfaction."[1] To be thus "carry'd" is clearly not to choose. But does Hume's enlistment of the services of reason bring us any nearer to choice? "'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience."[2] This time the agent does ask and answer a question. But his question is not *what* to pursue but *how*. The agent comes before us already determined by passion to the pursuit of a given end. Hume has managed the choice off stage. And, if we were permitted to peep into the wings, we should find no more than "aversion or propensity."

It is noteworthy that Hume's account "of the influencing motives of the will" is an immediate sequel to his account "of liberty and necessity."[3] His "influencing motives" are causes. And his "causes" are neither formal nor final causes but mere regular antecedents. Of any difference between the intrinsic natures of choice and desire Hume knows nothing. They differ in their antecedents only. Accordingly Hume can bring himself to say: "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an *Indian* or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter."[4]

All these possibilities (or impossibilities) are contrary to reason. But Hume is right in saying that "a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment."[5] Desire and aversion cannot be reasonable or unreasonable. And no variation of their antecedents could make them so. Where, then, is Hume wrong? In indicating by "prefer" and by "chuse" a state of mind differing from desire and aversion only in its antecedents.

That at least potential desire is indispensable to choice I do not deny. Nor do I here press the denial that even actual desire is indispensable to choice. But where would this indispensability lie? The

[1] *Treatise of Human Nature*, p. 414. [2] P. 414.
[3] Bk. II, Pt. III, Sect. I. [4] P. 416. [5] P. 416.

agent perhaps chooses whatever he chooses only because by choosing it he would fulfil his desire. If he chooses on this ground he must judge that what he chooses would fulfil his desire. If he is to make this judgement he must desire something—whether what he desires be simply what he chooses to realize or something further to which he judges that what he chooses to realize would lead.

The indispensability of desire would, then, lie only in this. Immediately indispensable to choice is a ground of choice—something that the agent takes for a fact concerning what he chooses and treats as a reason for choosing it. A ground of choice is not only immediately indispensable but also immediately sufficient. Nothing more, then, is immediately indispensable. But something more may, by being indispensable to a ground of choice, be mediately indispensable to choice. For a ground of choice must, besides being capable of being treated as a reason for choosing, be capable of being taken for a fact concerning what is chosen. Accordingly, if nothing except that by choosing it he would fulfil his desire is capable of being treated as a reason for choosing, the agent must take this for a fact. It need not be a fact. The agent may be mistaken. But at least some desire is indispensable even to his being thus mistaken.

What conditions the weakness of Hume's positive position is precisely what conditions the strength of his negative position and the weakness of the positive position of the moralists whom he attacks. Hume fails to offer a tenable account of choice, not because he ignores reason, but because he ignores irreducibly practical reason. But Hume's neglect of irreducibly practical reason is by no means an original error. Hume merely inherits it from the moralists whom he attacks. And indeed Hume may be said to make an important contribution toward the exposure of this error. Hume may be said to be the first philosopher to distinguish practical reason from the practical application of theoretical reason. The moralists whom Hume attacks had not drawn this distinction. They had based the claim that reason can be practical on grounds sufficient to show no more than that theoretical reason can be practically applied. Hume sees this. But, instead of looking for other grounds on which to base the claim that reason can be practical, Hume admits no more than that theoretical reason can be practically applied. Hume, then, may fairly be said in this connexion, as he has so often been said in other connexions, to have reached a false conclusion by a consistent process where his predecessors had reached a true conclusion by an inconsistent process. And Hume may fairly be said to have enriched the world by prolegomena to any future defence of the claim that reason can be practical.[1]

[1] This compliment to Hume presupposes the neglect of irreducibly practical reason not only by Hume but also by the moralists whom Hume attacks.

The question whether reason can be practical as distinguished from theoretical is the question whether reason can be related to at least some conduct, not merely in some such way, but in exactly the same way, as that in which reason is related to at least some judgement (knowledge—or—belief). To claim that reason can be practical as distinguished from theoretical is not to identify either conduct or any kind of conduct with either judgement or any kind of judgement. Rather, by distinguishing the being practical from the being theoretical, it is to distinguish every kind of conduct from every kind of judgement. But to claim that reason can be practical as distinguished from theoretical is to claim that, compatibly with the generic difference between conduct and judgement, there is an important resemblance between at least some conduct and at least some judgement.

We all apply the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable not only to belief, judgement, but also to action, conduct. We apply the distinction in a special sense to one kind of judgement, namely inference. In this sense, judgement is reasonable or unreasonable only if it is reasoned and according as, being reasoned, it is validly or invalidly reasoned. It may be plausibly argued that, since judgement is reasoned only if it is inference and since conduct plainly cannot be inference, vindication of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct must be sought in a different sense. There is a sense in which judgement of any kind is reasonable or unreasonable. In this sense, judgement is reasonable provided that it is guided by evidence. Since we all say not only that judgement, but also that conduct, especially choice, can be guided by evidence, the appeal to this sense looks promising.

Only when viewed at a distance. In choosing x we may be guided by evidence that x is productive of y. Hume fully admits this. But the admission does not help us. Hume would not make it if it did. What is here alone immediately guided by evidence is not choice but judgement. Not the choice of x, but only the judgement that x is productive of y, is immediately guided by evidence that x is produc-

And, while Hume has been allowed to speak for himself, the moralists whom Hume attacks have been convicted without a hearing. But Hume attacks "the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern" (p. 413). We cannot hear all this. Most ethical rationalism, however, is, like that of Socrates and Plato, unashamedly based on ethical intellectualism. Of "those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason" (p. 456) most, instead of trying to exhibit reason as practical, are content to exhibit virtue as theoretical. Aristotle's distinction of moral, from intellectual, virtue is a protest against the intellectualism of his predecessors. But Aristotle, although he tries, does not succeed in disengaging rationalism from intellectualism. I have examined his position in an article on *Rationalism and Intellectualism in the Ethics of Aristotle* now ready for publication.

tive of y. Reason is not, so far, exhibited as more than "the slave of the passions." Instead of practical reason we have found only the practical application of theoretical reason.

Perhaps those who would take "reasonable conduct" as a synonym of "conduct guided by evidence" are not in quest of practical reason but are content if they can exhibit theoretical reason as practically applicable. For it is plain that only facts can be evident, that the only attitude immediately appropriate to the detection of evidence is acceptance of fact, that only judgement can be immediately guided by evidence. And it is plain that no kind of conduct is judgement and that conduct can, therefore, be only mediately guided by evidence. But we may be told that, just because conduct is not judgement, conduct must not be expected to be reasonable or unreasonable in the same sense as judgement. Conduct can be only mediately guided by evidence. Only mediately, we may be told, can conduct be reasonable.

But how is conduct to be exhibited, on these lines, as even mediately guided by evidence? Suppose that, reasonably judging that by choosing x I should fulfil my strongest desire, I yet choose $\bar{x}$.[1] It may be protested that this is impossible. The protest would be ambitious. But I need not reject it. I think it owes its plausibility to the conviction that such choice would be too glaringly unreasonable to be possible. Possible or impossible, would such choice be reasonable—reasonable simply because accompanied by *ex hypothesi* reasonable judgement? Would anyone say that the choice was mediately guided by the evidence by which the judgement was immediately guided?

To be mediately guided by evidence is not simply to be *accompanied* by, but is to be *guided* by, something that is guided by evidence. By what is choice *immediately* guided? If only judgement can be immediately guided by evidence, the obvious answer is that choice is mediately guided by evidence in being immediately guided by judgement. What, then, is the nature of this immediate guidance of choice by judgement? Unless we can answer this question, we cannot vindicate the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct as anything more than what Hume calls it—"a figurative and improper way of speaking." At the same time, if we can answer this question, we do not need to appeal to the sense in which "reasonable" is a synonym of "guided by evidence." For, whether the judgement by which a choice is guided is itself guided by evidence or not, the choice can be held reasonable or unreasonable relatively to the judgement by which it is guided.

Rationalism has often been betrayed by preoccupation with discursive reason and neglect of intuitive reason. And it may be

[1] A course excluding x.

suggested that vindication of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct must be sought in yet another sense of "reasonable," wider than the narrowest but narrower than the widest, in which judgement is reasonable only if guided by *self*-evidence. I gladly concede that the sense in which intuitive judgement is reasonable or unreasonable is closely akin to the sense in which inference is reasonable or unreasonable. For inference is valid or invalid according as $\bar{p}$ *or* q is or is not self-evident. But how could an appeal to this sense of "reasonable" contribute toward the vindication of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct?

By enabling us, the intuitionist may reply, to take into account the only judgements whose reasonableness involves the immediate reasonableness, and the only judgements whose reasonableness involves the immediate unreasonableness, of conduct. Instead of such remotely relevant judgements as the judgement, that x is productive of y, or even the judgement, that by choosing x I should fulfil my strongest desire, we must consider, in order to vindicate the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct, such proximately relevant judgements as the judgement, that the choice of x would be right, and the judgement, that the choice of $\bar{x}$ would be wrong.

But how does the reasonableness of the judgement that the choice of x would be right involve the reasonableness of the choice of x? And how does the reasonableness of the judgement that the choice of $\bar{x}$ would be wrong involve the unreasonableness of the choice of $\bar{x}$? The intuitionist may reply by identifying the distinction between right and wrong choice with the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable choice. This identification I shall in season uphold. But the identification, even if justifiable, has still to be justified. Meanwhile, we must not rush into the gross inaccuracy of identifying the reasonableness of the judgement that the choice of x would be right with the reasonableness of the choice of x or of identifying the reasonableness of the judgement that the choice of $\bar{x}$ would be wrong with the unreasonableness of the choice of $\bar{x}$. Reason by which you *know* is theoretical—whatever you know and however you know it. Practical reason is reason by which you *choose*. Let it be knowable by reason that the choice of x would be right and that the choice of $\bar{x}$ would be wrong. *Ex hypothesi* I am unreasonable if I judge either that the choice of x would not be right or that the choice of $\bar{x}$ would not be wrong. Perhaps too I am unreasonable if I fail to make either of the *ex hypothesi* reasonable judgements. But suppose that, while knowing that the choice of x would be right and that the choice of $\bar{x}$ would be wrong, I yet choose $\bar{x}$. If such choice is unreasonable, it is not ignorance that makes it so.

The nature of the immediate guidance of choice by judgement thus eludes those who take "reasonable" as a synonym of "guided

by self-evidence" just as it eludes those who take "reasonable" as a synonym of "guided by evidence." It looks as if the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct is to be vindicated if at all only by turning back to discursive reason. Choice, we must boldly claim, is reasoned, and is reasonable or unreasonable according as it is validly or invalidly reasoned. Can this position be defended against the argument that, since judgement is reasoned only if it is inference and since conduct plainly cannot be inference, vindication of the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable conduct must be sought in a different sense?

Neither of the express premisses is assailable. If, however, the express premisses were the only premisses, the argument would be plainly invalid. Instead of the premiss, that judgement is reasoned only if judgement is inference, what is required for validity is the premiss, that choice could be reasoned only if choice were inference. So much, however, would perhaps be acknowledged by anyone who used the argument. And the argument may be more fruitfully diagnosed as an enthymeme. What makes the express premisses unassailable? Judgement is reasoned only if judgement is inference. Why? Not because to be *reasoned* is to be inference, but because to be *reasoned judgement* is to be inference. Choice plainly cannot be inference. Why? Only because choice cannot be judgement. The argument, then, can be fairly recast: Only judgement can be reasoned, choice cannot be judgement; therefore choice cannot be reasoned.

Thus recast the argument is plainly valid. What of the new premisses? To claim that reason can be practical as distinguished from theoretical is not to identify either conduct or any kind of conduct with either judgement or any kind of judgement. It is not the premiss that choice cannot be judgement that must be challenged. But to claim that reason can be practical as distinguished from theoretical is to claim that, compatibly with the generic difference between conduct and judgement, there is an important resemblance between at least some conduct and at least some judgement. It is the premiss that only judgement can be reasoned that must be challenged. We must claim that conduct as well as judgement can be reasoned,[1] that this important resemblance is compatible with the generic difference between conduct and judgement.

The generic difference between conduct and judgement can be better appreciated through recognition of a generic analogy: Conduct is related to deliberation exactly as judgement is related to inquiry.[2]

[1] Discursive reason is opposed to intuitive reason as a different specification of theoretical reason. Discursive reasoning is inferring. Accordingly, I do not say that choosing is discursive reasoning. But I do say that choosing is reasoning in exactly the same sense of "reasoning."

[2] As its *ἀποτελεύτησις* (*Sophist*, 264*b*.).

The acceptance of this analogy may be thought to underrate the difference between conduct and judgement. But those who would think so would themselves underrate the difference between deliberation and inquiry. Aristotle is right in declaring that inquiry is different from deliberation. But Aristotle is wrong in declaring that deliberation is a kind of inquiry.[1] For deliberation differs from inquiry exactly as choice differs from judgement. We judge that *something is the case* but choose *to do something*. We inquire whether *something is the case* but deliberate whether *to do something*.

Deliberation may be said, no less than inquiry, to be an attempt to answer a question. But the question for deliberation differs even more fundamentally than Aristotle sees from the question for inquiry. The answer is, as Aristotle sees, unknowable. The answer is also, as Aristotle does not see, unbelievable. And for the same reason. Being neither true nor false, the answer can be given as little by belief as by knowledge. It can be given not by judgement but only by choice. The answer has to be determined or settled but not found out.[2]

This fundamental difference between the question for deliberation and choice and the question for inquiry and judgement eludes our unfortunately ambiguous formulae. Deliberating whether to do this or not, what question am I trying to answer? How is the question, indirectly formulated as the question whether to do this or not, to be directly formulated? The only readily available formula is: "Shall I do this or not?" But a "shall" in the first person may have the force of a "will" in the third. The force of "Shall I be invited by him?" is that of "Will he invite me?" Thus construed, the question "Shall I do this or not?" may elicit the reply "You should know."[3]

Unambiguous formulae may seem readily available: "Ought I to do this?" "Do you advise me to do this?" But such formulae are far from meeting the need. It is partly because the ambiguity of the readily available formulae has driven moralists to adopt such unambiguous formulae that the question for deliberation and choice has been insufficiently distinguished from the question for inquiry and judgement. For to the questions *thus* formulated the answers *are* true or false.

These, therefore, are questions for inquiry and judgement, and they must be carefully distinguished from the question for deliberation and choice. "Ought I to do this?" differs from "Shall I do this?"

[1] *E. N.*, 1142*a*, 31–32. "*ζήτησις*" would be a good enough name for the genus of which inquiry and deliberation are the species. But that is not what Aristotle means.

[2] Signor Mussolini is reported to have attempted by decree to settle, without finding out, the answer to the question of the identity of the Rubicon.

[3] Unfortunately, we are allowed to say even that a man should know whether to do this or not, instead of saying that he should be able reasonably to decide whether to do this or not.

as "Ought I to believe this?" differs from "Is this the case?" And "Do you advise me to do this?" differs from "Shall I do this?" as "Do you assert that this is the case?" differs from "Is this the case?" Similarly, to offer "You ought to do this" or "I advise you to do this" in reply to "Shall I do this?" is to offer a second order reply to a first order question. The first order reply is: "Do this."[1]

To say that choice, no less than judgement, gives an answer to a question is not to neglect the generic difference between conduct and judgement. On the contrary, if we are to appreciate the generic difference instead of contenting ourselves with an insistence on its undiagnosed immensity, we can make no better beginning than by saying that choice, no less than judgement, gives an answer to a question. What we must go on to say is that, while the answer given by judgement, being of the form *This is the case*, must be either true or false, the answer given by choice, being of the form *Do this*, must be neither true nor false.

Is the claim that choice as well as judgement can be reasoned compatible with the thus appreciated generic difference? You may be properly asked why you judge that this is the case. With equal propriety you may be asked why you choose to do this. When you are asked why you judge that this is the case, what is demanded is the evidence by which your judgement is guided. When you are asked why you choose to do this, what is demanded is not evidence. But what is demanded is the reason by which your choice is guided. There can be no evidence for doing this. There can be a reason for doing this. It is possible no doubt to act without a reason. But it is just here that deliberate action differs from impulsive action. Only where what is done is done for a reason, whether sound or unsound, does the agent choose. Choice not only can, choice must, be reasoned.

What is chosen can be chosen only on the ground that, for the reason that, it fulfils some condition. What is chosen must, accordingly, be judged to fulfil this condition. This judgement may be reasonable or unreasonable according as it is guided by evidence or misguided by what is mistaken for evidence. But, where this judgement is reasonable, the choice, if reasonable, is so not simply because accompanied by, but because guided by, the judgement. And, even where this judgement is unreasonable, the choice may still be reasonable relatively to the judgement.

This immediate guidance of choice by judgement is the sole function of practical reason.

Choice is neither judgement in general nor inference in particular. But, while unlike inference where inference is like other kinds of

[1] To translate Kant's "Sollen" by "ought" is to miss the distinction between theoretical and practical reason.

judgement, choice is like inference where inference is unlike other kinds of judgement.

Choice may be said indeed to be like even judgement in general. Like judgement in general choice can be guided by evidence. But we have seen that choice can be only mediately guided by evidence and can be immediately guided only by judgement. And it is here that choice is at once unlike inference and like inference. For inference, like other kinds of judgement, can be immediately guided by evidence and is knowledge only if immediately guided by evidence. Yet inference, unlike other kinds of judgement, can be mediately guided by evidence and immediately guided by other judgement. And inference is knowledge only if, besides being immediately guided, it is thus mediately guided, by evidence.

Consider first the likeness. As choice must, if sound, be guided by judgement, so inference must, if sound, be guided by other[1] judgement. I have said that by evidence nothing but judgement can be immediately guided. I add that by evidence that p nothing but judgement that p can be immediately guided. If by evidence that p choice of x is mediately guided, it is so only by being immediately guided by judgement that p. Similarly, if by evidence that p inference that q is mediately guided, it is so only by being immediately guided by judgement that p.

This immediate guidance of one judgement by another exhausts the province of formal logic. For formal logic investigates inference to the extent of determining only the conditions under which inferences are valid, without determining whether their conclusions are known or are only truly, or even falsely, believed. This abstraction of the question of validity of inference, though it has been challenged, is legitimate. Equally legitimate is the abstraction of the question of validity of choice. As formal logic considers whether conclusions are reasonable or unreasonable only relatively to premisses, so ethics may be held to consider whether choices are reasonable or unreasonable only relatively to grounds. Ethics so viewed is concerned with the truth or the evidence of grounds of choice as little as is formal logic with the truth or the evidence of premisses of inference.

Fully granting the legitimacy of these abstractions as bases of systematic study, we must not allow either the agent in choosing or the thinker in inferring to exploit this legitimacy. We must insist that the agent commits himself in choosing, and that the thinker commits himself in inferring, to more than validity. More is claimed in choosing than that the choice is reasonable relatively to its ground; more is claimed in inferring than that the inference is reasonable relatively to its premiss. The ground or the premiss is itself acknowledged. The agent chooses x, the thinker infers that q,

[1] Not necessarily other in kind.

not *if*, but *because*, p. By satisfying the demand for validity neither qualifies for more than the right to sink or swim with his judgement that p. Only if the choice or inference is valid and if, further, the judgement that p is knowledge that p, is the choice or inference unassailable—absolutely and not merely relatively reasonable.

Where both these conditions are fulfilled, however, choice or inference is absolutely reasonable. And this brings us to the unlikeness between choice and inference.

For inference is itself judgement. Inference that q can, accordingly, be absolutely reasonable only if guided by evidence that q, only if, in other words, it is knowledge that q. If, then, valid inference of q from p is, where p is known, absolutely reasonable, valid inference of q from p must, where p is known, be knowledge that q. But this is possible only if, and is necessary if, q is validly inferable from p where and only where p implies q (p is inconsistent with $\bar{q}$, $\bar{p}$ *or* q is self-evident).

Choice, on the other hand, is not judgement. So far from being absolutely reasonable only if guided by evidence of x, choice of x would be thereby precluded. Nor is there any other evidence by which choice can be immediately guided. Validity of choice must not be declared on this account mysterious. Asked how we know that choice of x is valid relatively to the ground p, we must reply: By comparing p with x. Asked how we know that inference that q is valid relatively to the premiss p, we may reply: By considering whether $\bar{p}$ *or* q is self-evident. But we can consider this only by comparing p with q.

To admit that choice is thus unlike inference where inference is like other kinds of judgement is not to admit that choice must be unprincipled. There is a distinction between ground and principle of choice, and it is analogous to the distinction between premiss and principle of inference.

I infer that all men are mortal because all animals are mortal and all men are animals. That all animals are mortal and all men are animals is the premiss of my inference. I choose to enter the legal profession because to enter the legal profession would fulfil my strongest desire. That to enter the legal profession would fulfil my strongest desire is the ground of my choice. In order to distinguish the principle of my inference and the principle of my choice, we must begin by substituting unrestricted variables. I infer that every S is P because every M is P and every S is M. I choose x because x would fulfil my strongest desire. The principles are now easily obtained. The principle of my inference is: That every S is P is validly inferable from the premiss that every M is P and every S is M. The principle of my choice is: x can be validly chosen on the

ground that x would fulfil the agent's strongest desire.[1] That all men are mortal is validly inferable from the premiss that all animals are mortal and all men are animals and that to enter the legal profession can be validly chosen on the ground that to enter the legal profession would fulfil the agent's strongest desire are specifications of these principles.

Consistently with the admission that, while choice is a kind of conduct and inference is a kind of judgement, no kind of conduct is any kind of judgement, I have tried to establish the position that the difference between choice and other kinds of conduct is exactly the difference between inference and other kinds of judgement. Inference is reasoned judgement. Choice is reasoned conduct. This is what ought to be meant by distinguishing the faculty of choice as practical reason from the faculty of inference as theoretical reason. And it is what ought to be meant by saying that "the will is nothing but practical reason."

In this position, that choice is reasoned conduct, I find an answer to the question what moral rightness is. Once satisfied that choice

[1] I am not suggesting that this principle of valid choice is true. Nor am I here claiming that the syllogistic principle of valid inference is true. It suffices for my purpose that these principles, even if false, are sufficiently plausible to serve as illustrations.

But why alongside of an obviously true principle of valid inference do I place an obviously false principle of valid choice? Why not, rather than the less plausible principle of the fulfilment of the agent's strongest desire, select, say, the more plausible principle of the fulfilment of the agent's promise? Because I am not sure that either this or any equally plausible principle is a fundamental principle. Now, if it is a derivative principle, it should be formulated, not: x can be validly chosen on the ground that x would fulfil the agent's promise, but: x can be validly chosen on a ground validly inferable from the premiss that x would fulfil the agent's promise. And this, however true, is not a genuine principle of choice. It is a principle whose adoption involves not only practical, but also theoretical, reason. The principle of the fulfilment of the agent's strongest desire, on the other hand, could hardly be considered, whether favourably or unfavourably, as anything but a fundamental principle. Granted that we do not ask whether, we do ask why, the agent ought to fulfil his promise. Granted that we do ask whether, we do not ask why, the agent ought to fulfil his strongest desire.

Perhaps I ought in candour to add two confessions. (1) That x would fulfil the agent's strongest desire, even that x would fulfil any of the agent's desires, is, I am convinced, a good reason for choosing x, although it may be outmatched by a better reason against choosing x. (2) I am inclined to think that there is only one true principle of valid choice and that this is an elaboration of the principle of the fulfilment of the agent's strongest desire. Against the claims of actual desires the agent must, if his choice is to be valid, weigh the claims of potential desires, desires which he would experience if he fully entertained their objects. At least this measure of elaboration is indispensable. I am not convinced of its sufficiency.

is valid or invalid (soundly or unsoundly reasoned), we can scarcely forbear to identify principles of valid choice with moral laws. This identification is an analysis of *moral rightness* into *validity of choice*, a definition of moral rightness per genus, namely *validity*, et differentiam, namely *of choice*. For I attach to the word "validity" in the phrase "validity of choice" the same sense as in the phrase "validity of inference." *Validity of choice* is very different from *validity of inference*; but it is so only because *choice* is very different from *inference*.[1]

The further question of the content of the moral law I accordingly identify with the question "What is or are the principle or principles of valid choice?" Thus to identify the question is not to answer it. And the history of formal logic (the history, that is, of attempts to answer the question "What is or are the principle or principles of valid inference?), recording persistent failure to establish whether all valid inference, or no valid inference, or some but not all valid inference, is syllogistic, should be enough to warn us that a question concerning the number and the nature of principles of valid reasoning may be difficult to answer.

Meanwhile, before even trying to answer the question of the content of the moral law, we may see what question it is. And, by seeing what question it is, we may see that it is a genuine question.

[1] To analyse or define *moral rightness* is not to analyse or define *rightness*. But what is usually meant by saying in an ethical context that *rightness* is unanalysable or indefinable is that *moral rightness* is so. Taking the adjective "moral" to distinguish not a species of rightness but a sense of "rightness," philosophers hold themselves at liberty to drop the adjective and to use the unqualified word "rightness" in this sense. Thus Professor Broad says that "the kind of appropriateness and inappropriateness which is implied in the notions of 'right' and 'wrong' is, so far as I can see, specific and unanalysable" (*Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 165). And I do not deny what Professor Broad here says. But I do deny what I think Professor Broad here means. For I think that by "the notions of 'right' and 'wrong' " he here means those of *moral* right and *moral* wrong. He would not otherwise proceed to the question "Can the term 'right' be analysed into a combination of other, and not specifically ethical, terms?" (p. 166). Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Ethics*, pp. 42–3, 52, 315–16; Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics* (7th ed.), pp. 31–33; Rashdall, *Ethics*, pp. 12–13.

Since neither the term "validity" nor the term "choice" is an ethical term, my definition of moral rightness is what the Provost of Oriel would call "naturalistic" (*Foundations of Ethics*, p. 6). But my definition is very different from any that he examines. And I do not think he would classify my definition either as an "attitude theory" or as a "consequence theory." To the conclusion that moral rightness is indefinable the Provost says that he is "led by the break-down of the attempts to define rightness which we have considered." He is careful to add: "That they have broken down does not prove that every attempt must break down, but it creates a strong presumption that it will." Dare I hope that my attempt may survive the searching examination to which the Provost has subjected others?

I have encountered the protest that the expression "moral rightness" is meaningless. But I hope nobody will deny that he at least sometimes has a reason for doing what he does and that his reason must be either sound or unsound.

I have more than once had occasion to refer to the relation between the choice of x and the judgement that the choice of x would be right. The rightness of a choice is a property of the relation between what is chosen and the ground on which it is chosen. You can no more choose x on the ground that the choice of x would be right than you can infer that q from the premiss that the inference that q would be valid. But the judgement that an inference would be invalid precludes the inference. And an inference necessitates, upon raising the question, either the judgement that the inference is valid or the abandonment of the inference. Whether the choice of x is similarly related to the judgement that the choice of x would be right I cannot at present undertake to say. That my view of the likeness between choice and inference commits me to an affirmative answer, I am not convinced. Choice is unlike inference where inference is like other kinds of judgement. And every kind of judgement necessitates, upon raising the question, either the judgement that the given judgement is justified or the abandonment of the given judgement. On the other hand, I am not convinced that an affirmative answer would be false. I am not convinced of the possibility of knowingly doing what is wrong.[1] Appeal to experience does not here impress me. Until we find a man who has answered not only the question what moral rightness is but also the further question of the content of the moral law, *whose* experience can we relevantly consult?

[1] But the relevant possibility is not that of *knowingly*, but that of *wittingly*, doing what is wrong. An inference necessitates, upon raising the question, either the judgement that the inference is valid or the abandonment of the inference. The question is whether a choice is similarly related, not to the *knowledge*, but to the *judgement* that the choice would be right. To this question I now answer: *No*. Unlike inference, choice is compatible with doubt whether it is right and even with full conviction that it is wrong. Once convinced, moreover, of the possibility of *wittingly* doing what is wrong, we may reduce the possibility of *knowingly* doing what is wrong to the possibility of knowing what is wrong. It is only *qua* judgement that knowledge can influence conduct.

NEW BOOKS

A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. By Sir William Cecil Dampier (formerly Whetham), Sc.D., F.R.S. Fellow and sometime Senior Tutor of Trinity College, Cambridge. Fellow of Winchester College. Third Edition. Revised and Enlarged. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1942. Pp. xxiii + 574. Price 25s.)

Anything like an adequate history of science in a single volume of less than 600 pages is quite impossible. Still, there are degrees of inadequacy, and Sir William Dampier's volume is certainly the most meritorious of the existing single-volume histories. It is very unusual for a work of this kind to reach a third edition within a comparatively short time. Evidently the book has met a real need, and the author is to be congratulated on the measure of success which he has achieved. The criticisms that follow must not be misunderstood as a denial on the part of the reviewer that the book has any merits. It has, indeed, many virtues, in spite of its faults.

The inadequacy of this *History* and its lack of proper balance should be obvious from the following data. Antiquity is dealt with in 64 pages; the Middle Ages receive 41 pages; the Renaissance, 54 pages; the Newtonian Era, 57 pages; the nineteenth century, 130 pages; the period 1900 to 1940, 200 pages. The explanation, I imagine, is this. The author has written the book chiefly for his own satisfaction and amusement, and has naturally selected such topics as especially interested him, and afforded him the opportunity of making the comments he wished to make. When reading these chapters one has the feeling that one is reading a running commentary with the barest minimum of text. One does not get a real picture of the history of science, but interesting talks round about it. Possibly this constitutes the secret of its attractiveness for many. It must be very gratifying to be able to pick up material for pleasant conversations on the history of science and its relations to philosophy and religion without being put to the trouble of learning much about it. The production of such a work is really a literary achievement of no mean order.

As regards the relation of religion to science, the author has remarkably little to say when he is dealing with science among the Greeks and Romans, Moslems or Jews. The only religion in which he appears to be interested is Christianity. He is obviously a devout Christian, and his devoutness goes so far that he never uses the abbreviations B.C. or A.D. or St., but always writes "before Christ," "after Christ," and "Saint." In the circumstances one is rather surprised to find him having his little joke at the expense of the Catholic Church, when he remarks that "in 1822 the Sun received the formal sanction of the Papacy to become the centre of the planetary system." Irresistibly one recalls a certain character in Fielding's *Tom Jones* who, with exquisite candour, remarks that when he speaks of religion he means, of course, Christianity, and indeed that special form of Christianity which is known as the Church of England. However, let not the reader run away with the idea that Sir William Dampier is narrow-minded. Not at all, as the following noteworthy passage shows. "The Church of England," he tells us, "gives that historic order and dignified ritual, that established place in the structure of the State, necessary to keep religion in organic contact with the

whole of life. By its very constitution it is unable to enforce uniformity, and must find room within its fold for the Catholic, the Protestant, the Modernist, and the religiously minded Agnostic." This alleged liberality towards Agnostics almost suggests a new version of Pope's familiar lines:

"Its articles of faith let truthful cranks deride,
A Church cannot be wrong whose rites are dignified."

Philosophy receives a considerable amount of space. Two whole chapters, as well as parts of others, are devoted to it. Unfortunately it cannot be said that the author has made the best use of that space. He appears to be mainly interested in those Berkeleian speculations which Eddington and others have dignified by the name of "scientific philosophy." If one may say so without disrespect, the author does not show much knowledge of philosophy or aptitude for it. And he perpetrates not a few rather elementary mistakes. Plato's Ideas are identified with psychological conceptions, and he is represented as teaching that individuals have no reality until they are apprehended by the mind. Epicurean materialism is called dualism. Pragmatism is described as the view that the usefulness of a belief is just one *test* of its truth. Logic is represented as a department of psychology. Phenomena are identified with the concepts in which they are expressed. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is credited to Kepler and Galileo, instead of to the ancient Atomists. And so on. Even some of the statements about purely scientific matters seem to betray similar misunderstandings. The relativity theory is represented as meaning that we observe relations between physical concepts, which are subjective; that space and time are figments of the imagination; and are always relative to *someone* who measures them. The quantum theory is alleged to hold that we only *observe* probabilities. Finally, just one more dubious statement. "When we have discovered that an increase of pressure in a gas produces a decrease in volume, we can equally well say that a decrease in volume produces an increase in pressure." Can we? Assuming the temperature to be constant in either case, how can the volume of a gas be decreased except by increasing the pressure?

In the concluding paragraph of the book the author refers to the present world tragedy. "Since the rise of Nazi power in Germany, the freedom of science . . . like other forms of freedom has in that country and in other lands under its control, been destroyed by a rampant nationalism, which banishes men like Einstein and Haber from prejudice of race, and uses applied science and all other activities to further first secret military preparation and then open predatory warfare." In a history of science it might not have been out of place if the author had also indicated that science is to some extent to blame for the present predicament. The theory of natural selection lent itself too easily to international misapplication. Even Darwin saw "grandeur" in the struggle for existence among lower animals. And anthropology gave no little encouragement to Nazism and Fascism. This is clear, e.g., from the passage quoted from Sir James Frazer on p. 380 of this *History*.

A. WOLF.

Philodemus: On Methods of Inference. A Study in Ancient Empiricism. Edited with Translation and Commentary by PHILIP HOWARD DE LACY and ESTELLE ALLEN DE LACY. (Philological Monographs published by the American Philological Association, No. X.) (B. H. Blackwell, Oxford. 1941. Pp. viii + 200.)

The editors of this very carefully and pleasantly printed monograph have no doubt done a useful piece of work in supplying the British and American

students of the history of philosophy with this text and version of what remains to us of the polemic of the Epicurean Philodemus against Stoic theories of epistemology and logical method. At the same time I doubt whether even they themselves could in their hearts believe that Philodemus has much to say or that he is a person of more than third-rate intellectual ability. Formally his professed object is to contend that the Stoics are wrong when they maintain that the truth of a really universal proposition can only be guaranteed by the falsity of its contrapositive: universals can be proved true by an appeal to "analogy" (which, in fact, means in the mouth of an Epicurean, induction by enumeration properly conducted). Philodemus is thus attempting to maintain what Mill also wished to assert, that "necessary connection" can be established by induction by incomplete enumeration. But, unlike Mill, he seems to have no sense of the difficulty of his position. In many ways his argument is, in fact, less like Mill's own than it is like the view of those who maintain that such "induction" can give certainty because it can be so conducted that the examples examined form a "fair sample," and it never seems to occur to him—this is the measure of his philosophical incompetence—that on the premisses of a rigid empiricism such a "fair sampling" of an infinite collection is impossible. (For, to mention only the most obvious objection of all, the whole worth of the "induction" depends on its applicability to "*future* instances," and none of these, *being future*, can possibly have been taken into account in the "sampling.") The trouble with Philodemus, as with Mill, is, in fact, that he will not see, as Mill would not see, that, to speak with Hume, you cannot get necessary "connection" out of premisses which assert no more than *de facto* "conjunction." He betrays his blindness to the real position in a particularly glaring way when he tries to argue that the arithmetical proposition that 4 is the only square number whose "perimeter" is equal to its "area" is an induction by simple enumeration from examination of "*all* square numbers." That is, he asserts that it is by simple enumeration of instances that we infer from $n^2 = 4n$ the conclusion that $n = 4$. It has not even occurred to him that no one can enumerate *all* the "square" numbers. Or, to take another of his examples, he contends that we can confidently argue that because all the men we have examined are liable to mortality, therefore *all* men, in all places and at all times, are liable to mortality, that a man, *as man*, is mortal. Now it ought to be patent that I can only reach this conclusion on the assumption that the men whose cases I have examined are a "fair sample" of men always and everywhere, and that this assumption requires for its justification some non-empirical premiss. No mere controversial success in establishing his contention that the Stoics are inconsistent with themselves can remove this fatal objection to the Epicurean epistemology. You cannot prove that Epicurus is right by showing that Chrysippus is wrong, except on the arbitrary assumption that both of them cannot be wrong. The question is not whether in some way "experience" cannot yield knowledge of "*laws* of nature," but whether, if it can, experience itself must not be something more than awareness of *de facto* "conjunction."

I am not sure that the editors themselves are fully alive to the point, since I find them in their Preface actually mentioning Hobbes and Leibniz apparently as examples of empiricists in epistemology. As to Leibniz, who, in fact, really held that all true propositions are "analytical" and that this is the very meaning of the statement that they are *true*, I imagine that this is the first time he has ever been claimed as an empiricist. And as to Hobbes, as readers of *Leviathan* will know, it is fundamental with him that "experience concludeth nothing universally," and it was on this ground that he con-

sistently disparaged the experimental work of men like Boyle. The notion that he was in any way an empiricist is itself a false induction from the premisses that he was a materialist and that materialists have often professed to be empiricists. But Hobbes's reasons for *his* materialism are strictly *a priori*. (They are as *a priori* as his ethics, which depend throughout on the categorical imperative that it is an indefeasible obligation to "perform a covenant once made.")

In the text of the fragment the editors have apparently contented themselves to rely upon the previous work of Scott, Philippson and Gomperz, though I note here and there that their translation seems to adopt a reading which has been relegated to the *apparatus criticus*, and that occasionally it seems to presuppose some tacit correction. There are also a number of places where explanatory paraphrase, which may or may not be correct, is wholly substituted for strict translation, and others where, so far as I can see, the rendering is definitely unsuitable or impossible. Thus, to give only one or two examples, the rendering of column xxxii, 5 of the text seems to me manifestly wrong. The translation should be, "As if *they would not be asked* about inference from similarities, how contraposition comes in, and even more about inferences from contraries. And further *we say* that [*not "they ignore* the fact" that we say that] there is only one form of induction by similarity, not three." (Oddly enough, the footnote on the passage assumes this correct translation, though the English text completely perverts the sense.) So at col. xxxv, 29–31, what Philodemus really says is not that we "do not not use analogy" where contraposition is employed, as the translation makes him say, but that "the case in which contraposition is employed is not the *only* one in which we—the Epicureans—assert necessary correction." So again there is a bad misrendering at col. xxxviii, 18. The true sense is not "he who has established a test of controversies by the method of analogy differs from the Stoics in the highest degree," but "he who sets up such a test as this of the method of analogy [viz. agreement with his own preconceived dogmas] is something very different from a controversialist" (or perhaps "is in a very different position from his controverters"). The translators omit altogether the words *ταύτηνκαὶ τοιαύτην* in l. 18, and render the *τοῦ* of the next line as though it were *τῶν*, and the *ἀμφισβητούντων* of l. 20–21 as though it were *ἀμφισβητουμένων*. Errors like this make it a little unsafe to rely implicitly on the English as a correct reproduction of the author's sense, and the danger is increased by the very loose renderings of important conjunctions and particles. (E.g. *διότι* means "because," not "therefore.")

There is one curious misrendering which occurs three times over, and so is apparently not a mere *lapsus calami*, in the editorial account of the Stoic definition of a "sign," *ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος*. This is thrice rendered by the (ambiguous) phrase "the proposition in a sound *condition* which is antecedent and reveals the consequent." The meaning of this is quite obscure in English, though the sense of the Greek is plain enough, viz. that a "sign" is "the antecedent in a sound *hypothetical proposition* (a *συνημμένον*), which (antecedent) is revelatory of the consequent." E.g. if I say "where there is smoke there is fire," this is a sound *συνημμένον*, and therefore the presence of the smoke which I see is revelatory of the existence of the (unseen) fire. I presume the editors understood this correctly, but their rendering would hardly be intelligible to a reader who did not already know the Greek.

I must reluctantly also call attention to a very bad incidental error about Plato in a note to p. 75. "Plato also says that God has both soul and body."

The reference given is *Phaedrus* 246 [c.]. But what Plato really says is—I purposely quote him in a version not my own—that "without having either seen or formed an adequate conception of a god, we *picture him to ourselves* (*πλάττομεν*) as an immortal animal possessed of soul and possessed of body." Plato is actually protesting against the "corporealist" fancies which the editors ascribe to him.

A. E. Taylor.

The Problems of Logic. By Andrew Paul Ushenko. (London: George Allen & Unwin. 1941. Pp. 225. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

In this book Professor Ushenko criticizes the view that logic can be treated wholly as the manipulation of symbolic calculi according to arbitrary rules. Logic is not identical with mathematical logic and deduction is more than linguistic transformation. Logicians have assumed too easily an analogy between logic and the "alternative" systems of geometry. They have overlooked the *comprehensiveness* of logic. The fact that no rational inference can be made in any system if *p* and not-*p* are both asserted to be true at the same time is *logically* important. No collection of symbols which appeared to permit this contradiction could ever be *used* in discourse or would properly be called logical. Some "alternatives" therefore appear to be impossible. The discussion of this, and similar questions, requires, besides logic, a *theory* of logic. This must contain all discussion of logical forms, symbolic notations and their interpretation and most consist, in part, at least, of non-formal statements. Questions about the nature of propositions, the meaning of "truth," the relation of logic to empirical fact, the status of logical principles, cannot be asked or answered within the limits of postulational technique. Nor is it enough to refer such problems to a philosophical dustbin called "metalogic." For "*'p' is a metalogical statement*" itself requires interpretation which leads to a highly unconvincing hierarchy of dustbins and the strange conclusion that "Clothes rationing was introduced in England in 1941" and "It is true that clothes rationing was introduced in England in 1941" occur in different "languages" although both are English sentences.

I agree with many of Professor Ushenko's criticisms of the attempts by recent logicians to explain our knowledge of the necessity of certain formal properties and principles in deduction as linguistic choice determined by historical accident (p. 30). No one does in fact choose between more or less convenient linguistic alternatives in rejecting an invalid argument and accepting a valid one. Though having reason might be described as a historical accident, I am not sure that "Men might not have been able to reason" is a sensible proposition but it does seem certain that "The general application of the law of contradiction is a historical accident" is an absurd statement. Professor Ushenko's alternative explanation, however, is not more convincing than the theories he criticizes. He reverts to something like Cartesian logical intuitions, but intuitions which are not infallible. "The ultimate basis of validating forms is intuition" (p. 31). We intuit the distinction between valid argument and logical error, between different types and categories (Professor Ushenko concludes in Chapter 2 that no general solution of the logical paradoxes is possible, but each must be treated separately), and the necessity of logical principles. Nevertheless, we may, like Descartes, be mistaken. This is because our intuitions depend on analysis and description which may not be adequate. When these are improved intuition corrects itself (p. 32). Without some examples of this process, it is difficult to say whether this extension of the use of the word "intuition" is desirable.

"Corrigible intuitions" seems a contradiction by any ordinary use of "intuition." The appeal to intuition usually indicates either unwillingness to examine evidence or the absence of any need for evidence. The second is true of fundamental logical principles and distinctions. "I know by intuition that p cannot be both true and false in the same context at the same time." What does "by intuition" add to "know" in that statement? Is it not formed by a false analogy with "I know by looking that roses are red" and "I know by hearing that noises are loud," as though "intuition" were a kind of sixth sense? There may well be arguments of which it is difficult to say whether they are valid or not and propositions (especially in such a science as physics) which seem both necessary and contingent but when they *are* determined it seems pointless to add "This was the result of a very peculiar linguistic choice" or "This was due to intuition." Professor Ushenko's criticisms of the linguistic school, however, do help to show the important differences between logic and language and where the analogy between them fails. This is important.

The book contains interesting discussions of the logical paradoxes, the nature of concepts and propositions, the relation between language and fact and truth and falsity. Many of the problems are solved for Professor Ushenko by "conceptual reference" (Ch. 4) which facilitates communication, mediates between logic and reality and permits all propositions to be true in some sense (p. 127). These views cannot be made plausible without a great deal more argument and concrete illustration than 200 pages permit.

M. MACDONALD.

Descartes: Discours de la Méthode. Edited with Introduction and Remarks by GILBERT GADOFFRE. (University of Manchester. 1941. Pp. xliii + 94. Price, 3s. 6d. net.)

Of this new edition of the French text of Descartes' *Discourse on Method,* presumably intended mainly for students of French, for whose help a glossary of words is provided, the most important part philosophically is the editor's Introduction together with the Remarks. The discussion throughout shows a wide acquaintance with Cartesian literature—at least French, a mastery of certain crucial data, and a very effective presentation of the argument, on which the influence of the letters to Huygens, published some time ago, can be seen. The development of science and equally of architecture, music, and poetry, as well as of religion in relation to Cartesianism, and the relative positions of Cartesianism and the rationalism of the period are discussed, and the views expressed may be read with profit.

But above all, the Editor underlines the delusive simplicity and clarity of the *Discourse* which indeed is about as communicative and informative as a modern military communiqué; and it is really this feature which makes possible the main subject of his Introduction, namely the history of the formation of the *Discourse.* The argument is directed against the widespread and influential view that the *Discourse* is a completely coherent and homogeneous whole, composed in a hurry and within one single period, any contradictions being superficial; and it seeks to show that its arrangement is strange and arbitrary, that the parts were written at different times, the later ones, especially Part III, being prompted by special motives and aiming at putting Descartes' own philosophy in a favourable light. The evidence consists of the results of an analysis of the structure of the *Discourse* itself, and of chronological and biographical data, particularly concerning the critical year 1636–7, gathered from various sources.

The full philosophical significance of the Editor's theory of the formation

of the *Discourse* could be appreciated only in the light of that reinterpretation of Cartesianism which would result from its application, but at which, owing to unfortunate contemporary events, he can only hint. In the meantime, however, two general points may be mentioned. First, in view of the importance assigned to contradiction, it is unfortunate that the examples cited, if they are contradictions at all (this depending on how the *Discourse* is interpreted), are not *philosophically* impressive. (Is an editor under an obligation to adhere to his own text? The latter says "étranger en son pays," while in his Introduction he writes *à* instead of *en*.) Second, it requires to be emphasized that the issue for the Editor is a biographical and chronological one, and that this must not be confused with a philosophical issue. Descartes, in his analogy in Part II of the *Discourse* asserts that the houses and streets of a town ought to be built according to a thought-out plan, not according to a certain chronological order. So, the Editor's frequent references to the relation of the *Discourse* to Descartes' *Works*, if conceived in terms of the order in which and of motives from which they were written or published, are not very relevant to Descartes' philosophical scheme or plan, and would appear to introduce fresh contradictions which strike at a fundamental principle of Cartesian *order*.

B. M. Laing.

The Nature of the World. By W. T. Stace. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1940. Pp. vi + 262. Price 18s. 6d.)

Professor Stace will, I am sure, forgive my delay in reviewing his book—a delay chargeable to the "war effort." There is a certain pleasure, while the struggle to survive grows ever shriller, in reading a book so simply and bravely titled, and so detached from every strain of the actual and temporal world.

The distinguished author has reversed the order of development usual in recent British philosophy. He set out with Hegel, but he returns home with the greatest of his fellow-Trinitarians, with Bishop Berkeley. The author has his little differences with the Bishop, but on the whole they are at one. He describes his metaphysics as a phenomalism. It might by another be described as a personalistic pluralism. Philosophy, as he sees it, is hypothetical; it consists of factual material knit together by explanatory hypotheses. If an objector dislikes the hypotheses, or any one of them, the onus is upon him to make a better showing with others. His view of philosophy, in its broad aspect, seems to me to be true, and well put. Speculative Philosophy can never terminate in anythng but open alternatives.

The leading hypothesis of this system is that reality consists of cells. A cell is *data* and *consciousness*. Either of these two is an abstraction if considered apart from the other. If one must use substance language, then substances are cells, and there are no others. Data and consciousness are treated as strictly correlative, but as the thesis develops it seems to me that consciousness takes the leading part. Or if it does not, then, to make sense of the position, it should. Consciousness is *thinking*. Of this all other phases of consciousness are modes or aspects. Sensing and imaging, as well as wishing or feeling and valuing are all in essence thinking. With the manifold difficulties with which such identifications bristle the author strives bravely, but not, I think, successfully

Material things and the order of nature are seen much as Berkeley saw them. "A material object is a succession of sense-data following each other

in time in an order determined by definite laws" (p. 88). The laws, however, turn out to be the usual expected series of events. Causal relations are as Berkeley (so far as they concerned things) described them. But while Berkeley did see it as a problem that watches had works, Professor Stace seems quite unpuzzled by this aspect of the problem. It seems to me quite crucial, and quite devastating to both. After all, why *do* watches have works?

In the absence of a "public" world Professor Stace guarantees perception by many perceivers of the "same" world by means of his further capital hypothesis namely, the principle of cellular correspondence, which does for Stace what God does for Berkeley. This he understands rather in the fashion of Leibniz' harmony, with the exception that he repudiates its pre-establishment. If an objector dislikes the hypothesis he is bidden to overcome his feelings, since it merely describes what is "actually found as facts in the universe." Since other minds are not parts of my data, I can never be perceptually aware of them. Nor can I know them as I am aware of myself. But it is another hypothesis that other minds exist. "If you start from a position containing the premiss that there is a plurality of minds, you cannot possibly by any logical process arrive at a conclusion which includes the proposition that there is only one mind." This hypothesis is not on all fours with the realist belief in continuant material things. Of the possible nature of the latter he can form no conjecture, but of a mind he has a "clear idea." It possesses, "the same kind of qualities which I introspect in my own mind" (p. 111). Thus does the author avoid the solipsistic impasse.

"Every datum," he continues, "has value." "Value is the dynamic force which keeps the world in being" (p. 196). What, having given up the notion of production or activity as contained in the idea of cause, he means by "dynamic force" passes my comprehension. Partly he means that without interest there would be no cognition, no consciousness; which is true enough in its way. He concludes by admitting on mystical evidence the possibility of a Divine Being or "super-cell." This super-cell he describes in a fashion reminiscent of H. G. Wells's *God the Invisible King*, of whom we read when we were very young.

There can be no doubt as to the force, competence, and ingenuity of Professor Stace's work. He knows his way around, and what he has to say he says clearly and well. But to me (for what the opinion is worth) he seems curiously blind to the obvious. He is so wrapped up in the epistemological outlook that he cannot see beyond the conditions of *cognition* as conditioning *existence*. One cannot say anything about a horse unless one knows (or believes) something about a horse; but notwithstanding this over-riding epistemological condition it seems to me just nonsense to say, "A particular horse is a certain pattern of sense-data" (p. 22). This is too anthropocentric, too pre-Copernican. A horse is, surely, a beast that pulls loads, and goes on pulling even though the carter turns his back for a moment. How the principle of cellular correspondence looks after the horse's unobserved labour I do not know.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

The Path to Reconstruction. A brief Introduction to Albert Schweitzer's Philosophy of Civilization. By MRS. CHARLES E. B. RUSSELL. (London: Messrs. A. & C. Black. 1942. Pp. xii + 68. Price 3s. 6d.)

Whatever may be the ultimate value of Dr. Schweitzer's teaching, he will live as an outstanding personality: as a distinguished organist, one of the

greatest living authorities on Bach, a missionary doctor, a theologian and philosopher. All these activities harmonize in the light of his *weltanschauung* of "world-and-life-affirmation" which Mrs. Russell defines, rather clumsily, as the "inner conviction that life is a real thing, that the world in itself and life in itself have great value, that life is for each individual infinitely worth while, that the human spirit can dominate nature, and that man must never admit defeatism"—a conviction that expresses itself in the profound "reverence for life" that has flowered in his missionary work.

His philosophy, as expounded here, appears to suffer from a certain over-simplification of content, together with an occasional obscurity and contradictoriness of expression. One example of over-simplification is his view (again, in the authoress' words) that "all truth that is profound is simple and can be reproduced in simple terms." If this is so, the writings of the majority of great mystics and philosophers must go overboard. As an example of obscurity, in direct contradiction to his own dictum on the simplicity of truth, one may cite his views on reason (page 35 *et seq.*); and there is an unresolved antinomy in his approach to subjective optimism and the pessimism proceeding from a contemplation of the external world. It may be that some of these difficulties arise from the authoress' manner of expression: she confesses to feeling "absolutely unequipped for the task . . ." In one place she appears to confuse Being and Will: she writes of "devotion of our being to infinite Being," and a few lines later of "the infinite unfathomable Will in which all being has its origin."[1] But surely Being must precede Will? And elsewhere she makes the sweeping statement that "the classical explanation of ethics is so unsatisfactory that we need no longer consider it." The above, together with the quotation in para. 1 give some indication of the quality of the book. Nevertheless, Mrs. Russell does succeed in putting over something of Dr. Schweitzer's message, as apart from the metaphysical formulation of it. An excellent Bibliography is appended, giving a list of books and articles by Dr. Schweitzer and about him. ROBERT HAMILTON.

Books also received:—

L. P. JACKS. *The Confession of an Octogenarian.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1942. Pp. 272. 15s. net.

J. B. SKEMP. *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues.* Cambridge University Press. 1942. Pp. xv + 123. 8s. 6d. net.

E. H. CARR. *The Conditions of Peace.* London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1942. Pp. xxiv + 279. 12s. 6d. net.

E. PARL WELCH. *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1941. Pp. xxiv + 337. 22s. net.

S. C. ROY. *The Bhagavad-Gītā and Modern Scholarship* (Interpretations of the Bhagavad-Gītā, Book I). London: Luzac & Co. 1941. Pp. xviii + 270. Paper cover 7s. 6d., cloth binding, 10s. 6d.

RICHARD BERNHEIMER, RHYS CARPENTER, K. KOFFKA, MILTON C. NAHM. *Art: a Bryn Mawr Symposium.* Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press Inc. 1940. Pp. xii + 350.

HANS REICHENBACH. *From Copernicus to Einstein.* Translated by Ralph B. Winn. New York: Philosophical Library. Alliance Book Corporation. 1942. Pp. 123. $2.

[1] But perhaps Mrs. Russell means that 'infinite Being' and 'infinite unfathomable Will' are in fact identical, and give rise to individuals. (ED.)

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CORRESPONDENCE

HAVE "RIGHT" AND "WRONG" ONE MEANING FOR ALL MANKIND?[1]

The author of the following letter has been professor of philosophy at Harvard since 1913, is the author of many books, a former president of the American Philosophical Association, and chairman American Defence, Harvard group.

There are two teachings that are skilfully propagated in our own time and have a wide audience. The first of these is the teaching that convictions do not matter. It is simple-minded, so the argument runs, to suppose that historical events are deliberately planned. Tolstoy is cited as an authority to show that Napoleon's defeat in Russia was due not to the greatness of Prince Kutuzov, but to the inevitable trend of things. Great men do not make history, but are made by history. They are fortunate enough to profit by a collective will which moves the mass of mankind. They simply sense its direction and fall into step at the head of the column.

The application to the present crisis is evident. The rise of the Axis menace is not the work of Hitler or of Mussolini or of the Japanese military party. It is not to be explained by the ideas which these nations or their leaders profess. It is the result of a "world revolution" of which these leaders are the puppets and the profiteers. It is idle, therefore, to blame either these leaders or their ideas. They are being swept along by the tide.

Those who would resist them, like America and the other United Nations, will recognize that it is idle to oppose this sort of cosmic surge. The best that can be done is to climb onto the driver's seat and seize the steering wheel. Then it is possible that we can alter the direction—slightly.

Not Wholly Clear

But even this is not clear. According to the strict letter of the doctrine, steering wheels are not in order at all. Events are marching by and one gets aboard, merely displacing the passengers already there, or asking them to move over.

That this teaching tends to weaken moral conviction needs no proving. It is impossible to hold moral convictions firmly and at the same time be persuaded that they make no practical difference. Those who are really persuaded that they exert no power over external events proceed to narrow the sphere of morals to their own inner consciousness, where they can exert power. The two things are inseparable —the conviction of what ought to be, and the confident effort to bring it to pass.

This doctrine of the impotence of individuals and ideas is seductive because it saves one from the pains of making moral decisions and the greater pains of putting them into practice. It is easier to ride on a wave than to swim, since it saves the trouble of choosing a destination and of propelling one's self toward it. And if Goebbels wanted to weaken our convictions he would seek to persuade us first that history is made by waves, and second that the Axis powers are on the crest of the present wave. Then having seen the folly of resistance, we would conclude that much the easiest and most sensible thing was to become a fellow-traveller.

This doctrine is not only dangerous to our convictions and hence to our hope of success, but discredited and false. It is the old doctrine of "fate" dressed up in modern clothes. It was revived in the nineteenth century to offset the overconfidence of the eighteenth century. Fate is simply a name for those causes which we do not understand, or which are so complex that mechanisms have not yet been devised for their control. Weather, for example, is still accepted as a fatality.

[1] This letter appeared in *The New York Times* of May 31, 1942, under the title "We are Warned Against Subversive Schools of Thought." The Editor has kindly consented for it to be reprinted in Philosophy.

Tolstoy No Scientist

Tolstoy was a great novelist, but he was not a scientist. His account of Napoleon's Russian campaign is a hodgepodge of agnosticism, fatalism, piety, patriotism and hero-worship. Great historical events are not caused by "the will of a single man"; they came about "step by step, event by event, moment by moment," "as the result of an infinite number of heterogeneous conditions."

It is impossible to answer the question, "When Moscow was abandoned," and as to the return to Moscow, "the Russian Army could have done nothing else." Greater than the "great" are those "solitary men who, being able to comprehend the will of Providence, subordinate their own wills to it."

Such was Prince Kutuzov, whom the will of Providence had apparently appointed its agent for "the salvation and glory of Russia." And then, finally, it appears that Kutuzov was peculiarly qualified for this assignment, because he refused to identify the salvation of Russia with the defence of Moscow, because he alone "understood the meaning of what was taking place," and because, knowing the condition of both armies, he fitted his action, or inaction, to the times and circumstances and to the requirements of grand strategy.

The lesson to be learned from Nazi Germany and her more apt pupils is the precise opposite of the doctrine of fate. The Germans have so developed the techical arts, and the power of co-ordinating them, that they are pretty well remaking Europe with a blueprint.

Propaganda a Tool

Their development of the most formidable war machine of modern times, the timing of their aggressions, their depopulation of Poland, their destruction of the Jews, their integration of Central Europe and construction of an economic bloc based on barter, are not the results of any primal and inscrutable urge which happened to emerge in the fourth decade of the twentieth century. They are the achievements of highly intelligent men who know what they want and devise the necessary means.

They do not underestimate the difficulties; but they avail themselves of the latest and fullest knowledge, for they understand that knowledge and control are the same thing. Because they recognize the importance of the will of the masses, they have developed to an unparalleled degree the art of propaganda. And one of their most effective methods of making history is to persuade the men who might otherwise oppose them that history is not made by men but men by history.

The second way of weakening men's moral convictions is to convince them that all moral convictions are equally right. For it is almost impossible, despite their large capacity for self-contradiction, for men to hold a definite moral conviction and at the same time harbour the idea that the opposite conviction is equally justified.

Here the Axis ideologists find us extremely vulnerable. We believe in freedom and tolerance, and is it not a corollary of freedom and tolerance to respect the other man's belief even though it be a belief in slavery and intolerance? In short, the more pure and scrupulous the liberal is, the more surely can he be counted on to befriend the enemies of liberalism. And once they are morally befriended, and their code is given an equal standing with our own, it becomes ridiculous to fight about it.

Muddle Needs Clearing

There may still be other things to fight about, such as life, property and territory, but the moral motivation is gone.

It is very important to clear up this muddle. For muddle it is. It arises from a failure to distinguish between a moral difference and a merely emotional difference. There is a moral difference between ourselves and the Nazis, because we believe that freedom is right and they believe that slavery is right. Both beliefs cannot be true, and whichever is true is true for any believer, whether he be American or Nazi.

If we say "freedom is right" and the Nazis say "slavery is right," and if we then say their opinion is just as true as ours, we talk nonsense; precisely as though we

were to say, we believe that 2 plus 2 is 4, they believe that 2 plus 2 is 5, and their judgment is as true as ours.

If "right" is to be used as the predicate of a sentence which is true or false, then right must have a meaning. In spite of the moral scepticism which has run riot in the world during the last century there is little disagreement as to what that meaning is.

If two people needed food and there was only one loaf available, it would be right to divide the loaf rather than give it all to one. The right act is the act that best satisfies all claims as they are viewed by a disinterested observer. Slavery is not right, because it totally ignores the claims of the slave. Freedom is right, because it gives to each as fully as is consistent with giving to all.

This is not the whole of morality, but is its central core—whether it be expressed in the Golden Rule, or the standard of justice, or the gospel of love, or the goal of social welfare.

It is to be noted that when the Axis ideologists show a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind" they borrow the moral vocabulary of mankind. They complain of the injustices which they have received, encourage the aspirations of oppressed peoples, and boast of a classless society. But they have another code which they both profess at home and practise abroad.

Tribalism the Term

The best name for this code is tribalism—the supreme exaltation of the racial group. The folk, the nation-state united by common blood, is taken as the ultimate standard and authority.

This tribal entity creates obligations, but has none—either to its individual members or to the rest of mankind. It is a colossal ego which affirms itself, and against which there is no appeal.

In relation to the tribe the individual has duties of loyalty, discipline, self-sacrifice and military valour. But the tribe itself has no duties whatever. It is a law unto itself, and the ruler of the tribe, whether he be a hereditary monarch or a self-appointed Fuehrer, speaks in the name of the tribe and claims the same moral immunity.

Of this code the Nazi ideologists find illustrious exponents in their own past, choosing what suits their purpose and ignoring the rest. Whatever is universal and moral in Martin Luther, Fichte, Schiller, Goethe, Wagner or Nietzsche they omit; whatever is tribal and immoral they underscore and quote. They so write the history of German thought and culture as to make it appear that from the earliest days of the Niebelungen legends or the Teutonic Knights, Germans have felt themselves to be a chosen people who were devoted to no end beyond their own power and mastery.

To admit that this cause of tribalism is as right as that for which we fight not only robs us of our own convictions but amounts to an acceptance of the enemy's. For if one cause is no better than another, or is right in no sense that is not equally applicable to its opposite, then the ultimate appeal is to force. The better can then mean only stronger, and the evidence is survival and expansion.

War is Exalted

In order that this test may be applied it is necessary that the rival causes should resort to war; and war, instead of being a calamity or relic of barbarism, is thus exalted to the role of a final tribunal before which all international disputes are adjudicated.

At best this is a revival of the Teutonic ordeal by battle, in which victory in combat is accepted as a test of justice or of divine favour. At worst it means a return to the primitive practice of fighting out a quarrel without regard to its merits. It implies that the quarrels of war have no merits.

There are two ways of persuading us that as between the enemy's cause and our cause there is no moral difference. The first is to prove that theirs is as good as ours, since theirs is theirs as ours is ours, both being pursued with the same loyalty and devotion. This is the doctrine of the relativity of creeds, and is designed to appeal to our sympathy and our liberalism. Love thy neighbour's creed as thine own.

The second way of equalizing the two creeds is to say that ours is as bad as theirs.

This is an appeal to our cynicism or sense of guilt. This, it is said, is a war between imperialisms, one old and the other new, but otherwise the same. Who are we of the United Nations to cast the first stone? Are we not guilty of every imperialistic crime? Should we not first cast the beam out of our own eye before attempting to pull the mote out of our brother's? Or, since both parties are imperialists, why not wash one's hands of the whole business and let the guilty destroy one another? Or, why not frankly admit that all eyes have beams and motes, and let it go at that? Admitting that we are no less imperialistic than they, and having got rid of all hypocrisy, we can then fight it out honestly and let the stronger possess the earth.

That Britain and the United States have both been guilty of imperialism is, of course, true. But by what standard are they "guilty"; and to this the answer is, their own standard.

There are two ways of condemning these old imperialisms. They are condemned by the jealousy and covetousness of new imperialisms—by the have-nots who would like to have and to enter in their turn upon a new phase of aggrandizement and exploitation. But they are also condemned from within by those of their own people who would like to rid the world of imperialism together, and extend the blessings of freedom to all mankind.

Things to Remember

No American should be allowed to forget that although we fought for our independence against George III and his "hired Hessians," the ideas which inspired that struggle, and which were embodied in the American Declaration of Independence and the bill of rights, were the ideas of Englishmen. Precisely the same thing has happened in the later evolution of the British Empire into the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Those whose conscience was most offended by the British conquest of the Boers were men like John Morley and the "Little Englanders," or their American cousins. Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada have become free nations without wars of independence because their peoples are imbued with the Anglo-Saxon traditions of liberty, and because the British Government has long had to reckon with the libertarian sympathies of its own people.

And the same is true of Ireland—for, despite the cruelties and blunders of the British Government, the most powerful force for Irish freedom has been the fact that modern Britain could not treat Ireland as Germany has treated Poland without violating the sentiments of her own people.

Doctrine Transformed

The Indian Agent General at Washington says, in defending the right of his people to independence, that they have been nourished on the "literature of freedom" introduced by their British rulers.

The same pattern of development has been followed in our own briefer imperialistic career. We have transformed a Monroe Doctrine into a Good Neighbour Policy. We have given our dependencies independence—not because we could not have them in subjection, but because that policy would have been inconsistent with our institutions and with the traditional creed of Americans. We conquered Aguinaldo despite the protests of our anti-imperialists, but though the anti-imperialists of 1898 were derided as sentimentalists and were outshouted and outvoted at the time, it was their spirit rather than that of the definitely jingo majority that fought so memorably on the Bataan Peninsula.

Let us grant that Western imperialism is suffering in this hour of crisis for its past sins. The important fact is that the sense of its moral bankruptcy is felt most keenly by the Anglo-Saxon mind itself. To our enemies Western imperialism is merely weak, needing to be strengthened by a change of masters and a new technique of mastery. To the Anglo-Saxon mind it is wrong, and needs to be transformed into a new and more radical system of freedom.

Universal Freedom

I am not interested in claiming a monopoly of the tradition of freedom for

English-speaking countries. Chapters of the literature of freedom are written in every tongue and inscribed in the hearts of men of every nation. The rapid shrinking of the world has spread the infection wide and brought a growing conviction that there can be no lasting freedom anywhere without freedom everywhere.

In a world which is now, for better or for worse, one world, not only in theory and before God, but in the everyday practical experience of its human inhabitants, we have to-day to decide which it shall be, the better or the worse. The worse way is to subject the whole of that world to one of its parts—to whatever part may be bold and powerful enough to achieve and hold the mastery. The better way is to create a federation of the whole which is stronger than any of the parts, and which may preserve peace and promote co-operation among them.

The rise of the Nazi and Axis power has forced this issue. It drives us to choose between a worse evil and a better good than mankind has ever known before. We must be visionary and utopian if we are not to be unprecedentedly base; in order to be realistic we must be loftily idealistic.

But this ideal has long been working is us. It is humanism, Christianity, liberalism, and democracy, carried to their logical conclusions. It means having the courage of our humane, Christian, liberal, and democratic convictions. It means attending to the unfinished business which was long ago included in our agenda. Most certainly we have a right to call it ours.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
May 28, 1942.

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

Even after his death much has been written about Henri Bergson and his Philosophy. But little appears to have been said about his "profound interest," as he himself repeatedly put it, in Indian thought. Having had the privilege and pleasure of meeting him in Paris in 1937, I wish to say a few words now on what transpired then. Here I may be permitted to state that I happened to refer to some points bearing on this subject in a short speech at the Philosophical Association of the University of Mysore, in January 1942, at a meeting held in honour of this great philosopher's memory. I am now writing out what I said on that occasion, as I am growing very old, and I fear I may by postponing fail to discharge a debt I owe to men like him, whom I met in my European tours, and whose minds were exceptionally free from all prejudices.

When I called on him he was ill and the attendant (probably the medical) hinted to me that the interview should not be prolonged beyond ten or fifteen minutes. But the patient would not permit me to take leave even after an hour and a quarter. Such was his love of matters philosophical even in his illness.

Having been asked about the peculiarities of Indian thought, I commenced with a reference to the *ONE* and *only* distinguishing feature of Philosophy in India. The West, I said, mistook India's Religions, Scholasticisms, Mysticisms, or Speculations for her Philosophy. In Europe and America multiplicity and variety characterize even what is called Philosophy. From Thales down to the present day, every thinker, be he philosophic, be he religious and the like, gives his own interpretation of life or existence, criticizing every other. Many, I added, had already disagreed with Bergson himself. This must go on to the end of time. And the evil *social* consequences of such continued multiplication of differences are quite patent.

The Indian thinkers say that *endless* antagonisms, wranglings, or wanderings in mazes of this kind are a characteristic of religion, scholasticism, mysticism, speculation and the like. And they ask, "Is there no knowledge revealing truth *common, universal,* and *harmonizing*?" Of what value is *Philosophy* if there be no certainty attached to its solutions? Truth common or universal, they say, must be the quest of *Philosophy*. What are called "truths" could only be degrees of or approximations to "Truth" *as such*.

Everywhere the man of religion and the like holds that whatever he *likes or delights in, or whatever he thinks he knows or intuits, is truth*. But history has shown how such beliefs have led not only to dis-harmony but also to inhuman cruelties and murders. Philosophy in India, therefore, long ago set its heart and mind upon seeking truth *universal*. It strives to attain this goal in *this* world, before death claims its due. It holds that the satisfactions of religions, scholasticisms, mysticisms, and speculations are just as good as the satisfactions derived from Art. They appeal to and vary with *individuals*. Indian Philosophy asks, "Can nothing bring about the 'good' and the 'comfort' of *all* humanity or all that exists, here, in this world?" Its answer is, "Truth by its nature is *common* and *universal*, and productive of *universal* good. And it is attainable in this world." Again, what do we mean when we make statements like these: "This is true" or "This is not true"? They convey no meaning unless we know what truth signifies. Unless we know what truth is, how could we say that "intuition," if not intellect, reveals truth?

He who starts without enquiring into the meaning of Truth, may be a religionist, a scholastic, a mystic, or a speculationist of the highest order, and be revered and followed by millions that know not what Truth is or even to ask what Truth is. But in India one cannot be considered a philosopher, whatever else he may be, unless he *commences* with a clear statement of the meaning of Truth, a clear knowledge of this Pole Star. In this country one who is eager to make voyages on the sea of philosophical knowledge, must equip himself with a clear definition of Truth. Otherwise, one will be like unto a mariner without a compass.

Here, Professor Bergson enquired as to how such Truth could be known or attained. I then gave a brief account of the method with its steps of which the first is "the Elimination of self" or "Depersonalization" the value of which every scientist of the West fully recognizes. The next step is the consideration of the *totality* of the available facts of experience, not fractions of them or the experiences of individuals only. European and American scientists though alive to the importance of this step, have as yet no idea of the co-ordination of the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep even of individuals. Lastly, I went on to the third condition or step. But even before I tried to state it, Professor Bergson *himself* referred to it, viz. the need for purging the mind of all its prejudices and pre-conceptions so as to secure what in India is termed "child-like purity and simplicity."

In these respects Western science is in perfect accord with the philosophic attitude of India, I said. And I added that Professor Bergson had rendered the greatest service to the cause of truth in making clearer the inseparable connection of Science with Philosophy, though Science goes only a part of the way. But as in Science, truth *verified* is truth for all, so in Indian Philosophy truth *verified* is truth for all, which alone can bring about the *good* of *all*. If there is but one truth (*universal*)—not truths—there can be but ONE PHILOSOPHY for the whole world.

Here the great philosopher of Europe made a remark which I consider most valuable, and which I can never forget. He said, "Yes, Philosophy is nowadays only a sport."

And I stopped talking though he was not for my winding up my Indian shop. He said that he was "profoundly interested" in Philosophy as pursued in India. This he stated in writing also subsequently. He repeated a number of times his desire that I should stay in Paris for some time and acquaint the Western thinkers with this peculiarity of Philosophy of India. This was not all. Even after I left Europe he made his friends write to me to find out when I would visit Europe again as he himself was growing old. Had he been in vigorous health, I might have succeeded in inducing him to pay a visit to India. Such a proposal had been actually made to him, at the request of His late Highness, the Maharaja of Mysore.

To sum up: He appeared to agree *fully* with the Indian thinkers in the view that the first thing to do in "Philosophy" is to make the meaning of Truth clear, and then to show whether one's interpretations of life or existence harmonize with it or not. If Truth be the same to all, there can be but one *Philosophy* in the world.

"Satyam Āyatanam" (Truth is the *resting* place).

"Sarva satwa sukho hitah" (Which promotes the happiness and good of *all*).

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER.

VANI VILAS MOHALLA, MYSORE, INDIA,
May 6, 1942.

INSTITUTE NOTES

THE Annual General Meeting of the Institute was held at University Hall on July 28th, when the Report of the Council and Statement of Accounts were presented and adopted, and the President, Viscount Samuel, delivered a short address.

Members will be notified when occasional lectures have been arranged for the present session.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented —Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.
These lectures are free to members.
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(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.
(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.
(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies, at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

[Suggested]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.